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FRANCE TELECOM/SPRINT ALLIANCE
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Congress was concluding nearly ten years of negotiations on omnibus telecom legislation.7
Whereas EC developments initially promised a
competitive landscape which would stimulate
many state-owned monopolies to privatize, U.S.
legislation would allow private local and long-distance phone companies to compete with cable
companies and other alternative providers of
telecom services. 8
In this evolving environment, state-owned monopolies in the EC and the incumbent long-distance carriers of the United States foresaw that
new and vigorous competition could deprive
them of their traditional marketshare.9 In response to their common motives of maximizing
their positions and providing new services in the
vastly changing marketplace, global telecom companies such as AT&T, MCI, Sprint and former EC
monopolies began forming international partnerships.10 Not since the dawn of railroad conglomerates during the industrial revolution has the development of huge, new corporate entities
brought with it both the prospect of newer and
faster consumer services and vast anti-trust implications. 1 One such global partnership, Phoenix
(later renamed Global One),'1 2 involved the joining of two dominant state-owned monopolies,
Deutsche Telekom ("DT") of Germany and
France Telecom ("FT") 13 with Sprint, the fourth

INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, both the United States
and the member states of the European Community ("EC") I have undergone sweeping changes to
their telecommunications ("telecom") markets.
Beginning with the 1984 divestiture of AT&T, 2 local calling services in the United States were delegated to seven regional Bell Operating Companies ("BOC"), leaving the former monopolist to
supplying long-distance services. 3 In contrast,
throughout most of the EC's existence, stateowned monopolies have been the sole providers
of both services and the necessary telecom infrastructure in member states.4 The EC recognized
that liberalization of the telecom market, whether
facilitated by divestiture of a private entity like
AT&T or by removing legal monopoly status in
place in the EC, promised an influx of competition. into the telecom marketplace and with it: accelerated development of . telecom technology,
higher quality service and lower rates.5 To insure
that potential competition would have to access
needed infrastructure and services, the EC embarked on a legislative agenda in 1987 that sought
to combine the goal of a competitive telecom
marketplace with a common regulatory framework among member states.6
During this phase of both liberalization and
regulatory harmonization in Europe, the U.S.
I The EC is one of three separate pan-European alliances
(also including the European Coal and Steel Community and
Euratom) that form the core of the European Union ("EU").
Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 creating
the EU, the titles of several EC institutions have changed. See

5 See infra text and accompanying note 25.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 28-29.
7 See infra text accompanying note 126.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 261-263. The EC
would, similarly propose access to alternative providers as a
means of beginning a competitive environment before full
liberalization of the telecom marketplace. See infra text accompanying notes 117-118.
9 See infra text and accompanying note 131.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 139-141.
11 See infra text and accompanying notes 321-323.
12
See infra text accompanying notes 267-268.
13
See infra text accompanying notes 170-171.

DR. KLAus-DIETER BORCHARDT, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE
OIPIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 59 (1995).

However, as most of this paper is concerned with legislation
arising under the Treaty of Rome creating the EC, the term
EC will be used throughout.
2 See infra text accompanying note 16.
3
See infra text accompanying notes 21-22.
4 See infra note 26.
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largest long-distance carrier in the United
States.' 4
This Comment discusses the development of
EC and U.S. telecom law during the past decade
and the particular impact that authorization of
Global One and similar alliances have had on effectuating the policy goals of both governments.
Part I focuses on the development of both EC and
U.S. telecom policy and legislation, from the divestiture of AT&T to the point at which the Global
One joint-venture was first considered. Part II examines the EC and U.S. aspects of the legal process by which Global One moved from a concept
to a government authorized global alliance, and
discusses new legislative developments that
emerged during that process. Finally, Part III addresses the twin issues of how the Global One alliance could be authorized despite its anti-trust implications and how authorization of the alliance
will enable the EC and United States to bring several telecom policy goals to fruition. This Comment concludes that government approval of the
Global One alliance was both necessary and prospective for four reasons. First, authorization of
the alliance facilitates the opening of the German
and French telecom markets, previously closed to
competition. Second, alliances like Global One
are the only entities positioned to properly fulfill
the telecom needs of multinational corporations.
Third, Global One and similar alliances possess
the resources and skills necessary to advance development of the information superhighway.
Fourth, EC and U.S. government structures and
legislation presently in place are competent to
check possible anti-competitive effects of Global
One.
See infra notes 236, 241.
Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on the Liberalization of Telecommunications, Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks: Part II - a Common
Approach to the Provision of Infrastructure for Telecommunications in the European Community, COM(94) 682 final at
37 [hereinafter COM (94) 682].
16 See generally United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982).
17 See James E. Meadows, Telecommunications Law in the
Age of Convergence, in PRACTICING LAw INSTITUTE, ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAw 201, 205 (June 17, 1996). DOJ's
14

15

revived interest in anti-trust action against AT&T had been
prompted by the corporation's aggressive efforts to block
competitive activity from then-fledgling MCI. See GERALD W.
BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATION POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION
AGE: FROM MONOPOLY TO COMPETITION 152 (1994).
18 See BROCK, supra note 17, at 153. A home telephone,

an example of CPE, could be purchased or leased only from
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I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Laying the Groundwork for a Competitive
Environment

t,

I

"

By the mid-1980s, competition existed in the
supply of equipment, services and in the long-distance infrastructure of the United States. A combination of legislative and regulatory intervention
and legal actions brought under anti-trust legislation opened the U.S. market. 15 The most important of these pro-competitive developments was
the 1984 Modification of Final Judgment
("MFJ"),16 which settled an anti-trust suit brought
by the U.S..Department ofJustice ("DOJ") against
AT&T in 1974.17 The DOJ's anti-trust argument
was based upon AT&T's control of three separate
telecom market segments: local telephone service,
long-distance telephone service and the provision
of customer premises equipment ("CPE").1 8
Although the DOJ considered the local service
market a "natural monopoly", the long-distance
and CPE markets were potentially competitive but
dependent on local market interconnection.' 9
Because of AT&T's aggressive efforts to limit competition by opposing terminal attachment and
providing competitors with inferior lines, the DOJ
concluded that AT&T was using its market power
to perpetuate monopoly control, not to "protect
[telephone] network integrity."2 0
To settle the 1984 suit, AT&T agreed to divest
itself of its twenty-two local telephone companies, 2 1 leaving it to provide international, long-distance and other enhanced telecom services.2 2
Pursuant to the MFJ, the local telephone companies reorganized into seven regional BOCs.23
AT&T prior to the 1984 MFJ.
19 Id. (explaining that, since the customer's premises was
only accessible through a local connection, long-distance

competitors would require access to this local connection in
order to provide this service).
20 Id. When AT&T supplied long-distance competitors
with local connection, it was often in the form of inferior
"line side" connections. Id.
21 See Catherine Arnst and Michael Mandel, The Coming

Telescramble: Deregulationis Launching a $1 Trillion DigitalFree-

for-All, Bus. WK., Apr. 8, 1996, at 65.
22 COM(94) 682, supra note 15, at 37 (explaining that a
1956 court imposed "line-of-business" restriction on AT&T,
limiting it to local and long-distance markets, would be removed under the 1984 MFJ).
23
See Meadows, supra note 17, at 202-203. The BOCs included: Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific
Telesis, SBC Communications and U.S. West. Id. at 206.
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Eliminating all barriers to interconnection that
AT&T had created, and allowing competitors access to crucial infrastructure, the MFJ required
the BOCs to provide "access services to interexchange carriers and information service providers ...

equal in type, quality and price to the ac-

cess services provided

to AT&T and its

affiliates." 2 4
With the divestiture of AT&T, the EC not only
recognized that increased competition would
bring an energized U.S. telecom market, but new
technology was transforming the industry. 2 5 With
all but one member state dominated by monopoly
providers in 1987,26 the EC published the Green
Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment ("Green Paper") ,27 the most comprehensive
review of telecom policy undertaken by the EC.2 8
The Green Paper proposed an aggressive legislative agenda for the transformation of the EC
telecom market based on a two-pronged approach: liberalization (the gradual introduction
of competition) and harmonization of the differing telecom standards (regulations) of member
states. 29 In a bid to combine the concepts of harmonization and liberalization in the best possible
24 Id. at 217. Access services are services which allow
competitors to originate and terminate interexchange telephone calls using AT&T infrastructure. Id.
25 See COM(94) 682, supra note 15, at 33. There was a
fear that the communications revolution, led by companies
whose entrepreneurial spirits and efficiency had been honed
in competitive markets, would leave Europe far behind. See
Alan Cane, Global Sell-off Gathers Pace, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1996, at 1.
26 The United Kingdom undertook privatization of its
telecom market during the 1980s, which resulted in the dominance of British Telecom and Cable & Wireless as a pre-ordained duopoly. See Pekka Tarjanne, Telecoms Privatizations
Do Work - If Structured Correctly, COMMUNICATIONSWEEK INT'L
No.161, Mar. 18, 1996. However, telecom markets in the rest
of the EC, including that of Germany and France, still were
dominated by wholly state-owned monopolies with exclusive
operating rights for the provision of infrastructure. See, e.g.,
Nicholas J. Nikolopoulos, Fostering CorporateNetworking in the
European Union, 4 CoMMiAw CONSPECTUS 27, 38 n.106 (Winter, 1996).
27 Green Papers are European Commission consultative
documents setting out basic policy goals for public debate.
See COM(94) 682, supra note 15, at 134.
28

SAI'ID MOSTESHAR, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TELECOMMU-

NICATIONs REGULATION 50 (1993).
29 See STANBROOK AND HOOPER,

KPMG EUROPEAN HEADA BUSINESS GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LEGISIATION 1035 (Bernard O'Connor and Christopher MacNulty
QUARTERS,

eds., 1993).

30 European Commission, Directorate-General XIII,
Open Network Provision (ONP) 1, Leaflet No. 5, in Pub. No.

75

iteration of basic principles,3 0 the Council of the
European Union31 adopted a Framework Directive32 on the Open Network Provision ("ONP
Framework Directive")3 3 and the European Commission 3 4 adopted a Directive on Competition in
the Markets for Telecommunications Services
("Competition in Services Directive") on June 28,
1990.35
The requirements of the ONP Framework Directive, despite being separate and distinct from
the Competition in Services Directive and from
EC competition law, secured the foundation for
introducing competition into the EC telecom
market. The EC recognized that monopoly control of infrastructure was preventing new market
entrants from competing for the supply of basic
services. Therefore, the objective of the Open
Network Provision ("ONP") was to guarantee
competitive access to telecom networks and services formerly dominated by monopoly providers.3 6 This access was to be facilitated through
clearly defined conditions standardizing tariff
principles and the technical interfacing of network connections3 7 among member states. As
most member state network monopolies were

EUR 16,616,

THE COMMUNITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY

(1995).
31
The Council of the European Union is composed of
ministers representing member state governments. It is the
principal law making body of the EU but acts only on recommendations from the European Commission. See STANBROOK
AND HOOPER, supra note 29, at 5-6.
32 A directive is a piece of EC legislation binding upon
each member state to which it is addressed, but leaves to national authorities the choice of forms and methods to implement a directive. The European Commission both proposes
and polices implementation of directives. See STANBROOK
AND HOOPER, supra note 29, at 39.
33
See Council Directive 90/387, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 1.
.34
The European Commission is composed of 20 commissioners nominated by member states to fulfill five-year renewable terms. The European Commission is charged with
initiating legislation under EU treaties and policing application of treaty provisions. Each commissioner heads a Directorate-Generale ("DG") to facilitate oversight of particular areas (similar to U.S. cabinet posts). See STANBROOK AND
HOOPER, supra note 29, at 13-15.
35
Commission Directive 90/388, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 10
[hereinafter Commission Directive 90/388]. Both directives
were preceded by liberalization of the telecom equipment
market in 1988. See generally Commission Directive of 16 May
1988 on Competition in the Markets in Telecommunications
Terminal Equipment, 1988 O.J. (L 131) 73.
36
See European Commission, supra note 30, at 1. ONP
was first discussed in the 1987 Green Paper but legislatively
set forth in the ONP Framework Directive. Id.
37 Id.
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guaranteed exclusive rights,3 8 the ONP Framework Directive stipulated that conditions for open
access to infrastructure should "facilitate . .. free-

dom of action [by potential competitors, but not]
unduly limit the [monopoly provider's] responsibility" for insuring the function and best possible
condition of network infrastructure. 3 To safeguard this public interest, ONP measures would
be proposed by the Commission through a cooperative process. 4 0 Member states would then implement ONP measures by promulgating conditions for network use that are based on objective
criteria, are transparent, published appropriately
and guarantee non-discriminatory access. 4 Finally, the ONP Framework Directive provided
that these conditions for access would be defined
and implemented in stages, affecting different
sectors of the telecom market one at a time.4 2
Subsequently, specific legislative measures have
applied the ONP principles to leased lines, 43
packet-switched data services, 4 4 ISDN, 4 5 and most
recently, public-voice telephony.4 6
Also approved on June 28, the Competition in
Services Directive instituted a "programme ... for
progressively introducing competition in the telecommunications market,"4 7 a market that presum38 See MOSTESHAR, supra note 28, at 71; see also Council
Directive 90/387, supra note 33, at 3.
39
Council Directive 90/387, supra note 33, at 7.
40 See European Commission, Directorate-General XIII,
Open Network Provision (ONP) 2, Leaflet No. 5, in Pub. No.
EUR 16,616, THE COMMUNITy TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
(1995). This cooperative process would include representatives of the member states, in concert with operators, service
providers, equipment manufacturers and users. Id.
41
Council Directive 90/387, supra note 33, at 3.
42 Id. at 4.
See generally Council Directive 92/44 of 5June 1992 on
43
the Application of Open Network Provision to Leased Lines,
1992 O.J. (L 165) 27.
44 See generally Council Recommendation 92/382 of 5
June 1992 on the Harmonized Provision of a Minimum Set of
Packet-Switched Data Services (PSDS) in accordance with
Open Network Provision (ONP) Principles, 1992 O.J. (L
200) 1. Switches are the routing circuits interspaced between
trunk lines in telecommunications infrastructure. A "packet"
is an advanced method of switching technology by which
messages are broken into packets, with data packets being
stuffed between voice and video packets, preserving capacity
and efficiency. Asynchronous-transfer-mode (ATM) is the
most advanced method of digital packet-switching presently
in use. See Peter Coy, Please Holdfor New Technology, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 8, 1996, at 84.
45 See generally Council Recommendation 92/383 of 5
June 1992 on the Provision of Harmonized of Integrated
Services Digital Network access Arrangements and a Minimum Set of ISDN Offerings in Accordance with Open Net-
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ably would be catalyzed by the implementation of
harmonized regulatory conditions under the
ONP. The Directive provided that all member
states withdraw special or exclusive rights for the
supply of telecom services other than public- voice
telephony.48 In formulating this provision, the
European Commission continued to rationalize
that the provision of a network within a member
state constituted a "distinct separate market" from
the supply of services; therefore, network infra49
structure could remain a monopoly function.
Similarly, in defining the term "voice telephony"
very narrowly,50 the Directive left services provided to the general public under monopoly control, while liberalizing other services such as
5
closed user groups and cellular telephony. '
B.

Telecommunications and Anti-trust
Enforcement

To understand why the European Commission
initially chose to begin liberalization while leaving
a substantial sector of the market under monopoly control, the relationship between the Competition in Services Directive and EC competition
law must be understood. The Commission's issuwork Provision (ONP) Principles, 1992 O.J. (L 200) 10. The
Information Society, infra note 123, at 6. Integrated Services
Digital Network is an ultra-high bandwidth (64,000 bits per
second) computerized network by which voice, data and
video applications can be transmitted and received via a single consumer line and access point. Id
46 See generally Proposal of 11 September 1996 for a European Parliament and Counsel Directive on the Application of
ONP to Voice Telephony and on Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, COM(96)
419 final, Official Documents of European Union Telecommunications Policy 1995 (visited Jan. 1, 1997) <http://www.ispo.cec.
be/infosoc/legreg/docs /94c37903.html>.
47 Commission Directive 90/388, supra note 35, at 10.
48 Id. at 15.
49
MOSTESHAR, supra note 28, at 55.
50 The Directive defines voice telephony as the transport
and switching of speech in real-time between public switched
network termination points, enabling any public user to use
equipment connected to such a network termination point
in order to communicate with another termination point.
Commission Directive 90/388, supra note 35, at 15 (emphasis
added).
51 See Herbert Ungerer, EC Competition Law in the Telecommunications, Media, and Information Technology Sectors, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1111, 1134 (1996). A directive specifically addressing liberalization of the mobilephone market was
passed in early 1996. See generally Commission Directive 96/
19/EC of 16 February 1996 Regarding Mobile and Personal
Communications, 1996 O.J. (L 20) 59.
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ance of the Directive was not only based on competition law5 2 but served to clarify competition
doctrine and the power of the Commission to apply it to the telecom sector.5 3 The fundamental
principles of EC competition law were set forth in
Articles 85, 86 and 90 of the Treaty of Rome.5 4
Under Article 85, the EC prohibits agreements,
undertakings, decisions or practices which may or
in fact affect trade within the European Common
Market.5 5 However, subsection (3) of Article 85
provides for the exemption of an activity from the
prohibitions of the Article, if the activity "contributes to the production or distribution of goods or
to promoting technical or economic progress."56
Additionally, competitive restrictions that receive
exemption must give consumers a "fair share of
the resulting benefit" and must be "indispensable
to the attainment of [economic] objectives."5 7
Whereas the Article 85 prohibitions apply to
agreements or collusions between market actors,5 8 Article 86 prohibits a market actor from
abusing a dominant position within the Common
Market "in so far as it may affect trade between
member states."5 9 In simplest terms, this equates
to prohibiting a market actor from using its dominant position to engage in activities prohibited
under Article 85 or stifling the lawfully competitive inter-State activity of other market actors.
Article 90 applies the prohibitions of Articles 85
and 86 to "public undertakings and undertakings
to which member states grant special or exclusive
52
See generally Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), 1
C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) (hereinafter EEC Treaty].
53
Subsequent to the Competition in Services Directive, the
European Commission issued specific guidelines to clarify
the application of competition law to market actors in the
telecom sector. See generally Guidelines on the Application of
EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Sector,
1991 O.J. (C 233) 2.
54 See generally EEC Treaty, supra note 52; see also VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION
LAW AND PRAcTICE 23 (5th ed. 1994) (explaining that the
Treaty for the European Economic Area (EEA Treaty), entered into force in January, 1994, and replaced the Free
Trade Agreements for most of the members of the EC. Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA treaty correspond to Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome).
See EEC Treaty, supranote 52, at art. 85(1). Specifically,
55
Article 85 is concerned with activity which fixes prices, limits
production or technical development or applies dissimilar
conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties. Id. at art. 85(1)(a-e).
56 Id. at art. 85(3).
57
Id. at art. 85(3)(a).
58 See KoRAH, supra note 54, at 2.
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rights." 60 Of particular importance to the Competition in Services Directive, subsection (2) of Article 90 provides that market actors "entrusted with
the operation of services of general economic interest," shall benefit from a derogation of (exemption from) competition articles if application
would obstruct the performance of the particular
task assigned to them.6 ' In 1985, the judgment of
the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") 6 2 in British
Telecommunications signaled it was for the European Commission to decide on any derogation to
be granted and the court favored a narrow inter63
pretation of that derogation.
In issuing the Competition in Services Directive, the European Commission was exercising its
broad authority under Article 90(3) to insure the
application of the competition provisions of the
Treaty by directive. 64 In maintaining a derogation
of Article 90(2) for an undertaking providing a
public telecom network, 65 the Commission affirmed a prior ECJ decision declaring that the
provision of a public network could be considered
a service of general economic interest, qualifying
exemption. 6 6 Despite maintaining exclusive
rights for the provision of infrastructure and voice
telephony, after passage of the Competition in
Services Directive, the prospect for eventual competition in the supply of basic services would motivate many state telecom organizations to consider
privatization. 67 In part because of the far reaching implications of the Directive, it was chalEEC Treaty, supra note 52, at art. 86.
Id. at art. 90.
Id. at art. 90(2).
62 The ECJ is the high court of the EU and is composed
of 13 judges assisted by six advocates-general. The ECJ can
hear cases appealed on points of law from the Court of First
Instance and has the authority to annul acts of the EC that
violate Community law. See STANBROOK AND HOOPER, supra
note 29, at 13-16.
63 Ungerer, supra note 51, at 1132.
64 See EEC Treaty, supra note 52, at art. 90(3). In addition, Regulation 17 of 13 March 1962 outlines, inter alia, the
procedures for notifying the Commission of a request for exemption, the application of fines and the opportunity for appeal of a Commission decision applying competition law. See
KoRAH, supra note 54, at 305.
65
Commission Directive 90/388, supra note 35, at 15. The
Directive defines public telecom network as the public
telecom infrastructure which permits the conveyance of signals between defined network termination points by wire, by
microwave, by optimal means or by other electromagnetic
means. Id.
66
See Ungerer, supra note 51.
67
Cf., Stephanie L. Harkness, InternationalPartnershipsin
the European Union Telephone Service Market: Towards a New Mo59

60
61
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lenged in the ECJ by several member states. Subsequent judgments confirmed not only the
legality of the Competition in Services Directive
but of the Commission's power to issue such directives and obligate member states to comply. 68
Whereas the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade
Commission Act and the Clayton Act 69 are the
principal U.S. antitrust statutes, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act is most relevant to this discussion of
telecom policy. 70 Section 7 of the Clayton Act
prohibits "acquisitions of stock or assets that tend
to create a monopoly or substantially lessen competition."7 ' Other sections of the Act "address
price discrimination, exclusive dealing and tie-ins,
and simultaneous service by persons acting as officers or directors of competing corporations." 7 2
Similar to the broad grant of authority to the
EC under Articles 85, 86 and 90, in amending the
Clayton Act in 1950, the U.S. Congress only required that an activity "may" lessen competition
or "tend to" create a monopoly before the government can take action.7 3 Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 7 4 like Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, prohibits contracts or other activity that constitutes
"restraint of trade,"'75 however, the courts have
consistently ruled it "to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade," 76 a significantly lesser
grant of authority.
Utilizing this broad authority, enforcement of
the Clayton Act is not only shared under the general jurisdiction of the DOJ and the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"), but also private parties are

allowed to sue for violations of the Act.7 7 With
specific regard to telecom, the states additionally
have a role in insuring a competitive market by
overseeing local service rates and verifying that
the regional BOCs comply with a checklist of conditions to prove that their network infrastructure
is open to competitive access. 78
The Communication Act of 1934 was enacted
to address the monopoly control over telephone
services. and to regulate the emergence of radio
broadcast companies.7 9 The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") was charged with administering the Act.80 In exercising its regulatory
authority over telecom, the FCC is expected to
"consider anti-trust concerns" in applying its
power.8 ' This anti-trust consideration plays a particularly important role when the FCC promulgates rules which encourage new or evolving
telecom entities to compete against existing monopolies.8 2 In the years following the issuance of
the MFJ, Senate Republicans on the Commerce,
Science and Transportation Committee charged
the FCC and the states with adopting "rules to remove barriers to entry, establish interconnection"
and network opening requirements, "and establish ajoint federal-state board to support universal

nopoly?, 19 B.C. INT'l. & COMP. L. REv. 187, (Winter, 1996).
However, privatization was not an explicit aim of the Competition in Services Directive. See generally Commission Directive
90/388, supra note 35.
68 Ungerer, supra note 51, at 1136.
69 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (Sherman Act); 15
U.S.C.§ 18 (1994) (Clayton Act); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994) (Federal Trade Commission Act).
7o
See infra text accompanying notes 197-198.
71
Stewart A. Pomerantz, Recent Antitrust Developments and
a Selective Antitrust Perspective of the InformationSuperhighway, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 808, 813 (Dec., 1995) (citing Clayton Act,
ch 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1994))).
72 Pomerantz, supra note 71, at 814 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§§ 13, 14 and 19 (1994)).
73
See Michael Botein, Cable/Telco Mergers and Acquisitions:
Antitrust vs. Telecommunications Act Approaches, in PRACTICING
LAw INSTITUTE, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONs AcT or 1996 479,
507-508 (May 6, 1996) (explaining the broad sweep of Section 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994)).
74 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
75
Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)).

76 Pomerantz, supra note 71, at 813 (citing Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-63 (1911)).
77 Id. at 814.
78 Mark Lewyn, Showtime for the Watchdog: Now, the FCC
Must Set the Rules for Reform, Bus. WK., Apr. 8, 1996, at 86; see
also Meadows, supra note 17, at 204 (June 17, 1996) (explaining that the Communication Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 151
(1994)) delegates jurisdiction over intrastate telecom to the

service."83

Similar to that of the United States, a primary
goal of developing EC telecom policy is to "reconcile increased competition with the public interest"8 4 in high quality universal service. Realizing
that both goals could be facilitated by competi-

states).
79
See Meadows,

supra note 17, at 203-04 (citing 47 U.S.C.

§ 151 (1994)).
80
81

Id.

Weber Waller, Legal Process and the Past of Antitrust, 48
SMU L. Rnv. 1811, 1814 n. 15 (July-Aug., 1995); see also infra
text accompanying note 226.
82 See Lewyn, supra note 78, at 86 (explaining that universal service is minimum service of specified quality and affordable price).
83 Pomerantz, supra note 71, at 812.
84 European Commission, Directorate-General XIII, The
Road to Liberalization 1, Leaflet No. 4, in Pub. No. EUR
16,616, THE COMMUNITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
(1995).
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Toward Development of an Information
Society

tion in a liberalized marketplace, the European
Commission accepted that continued derogation
of competition rules for infrastructure and voice
telephony service providers would impede further
progress.
With an eye toward assessment prior to removing the derogations, the Competition in Services
Directive provided for a full Commission review of
the telecom services sector in 1992.85 The review8 showed "new technological developments,
the advent of a single [European] market and the
changing international economic situation" were
diminishing the need for a "safety net" of exclusive rights for the provision of voice telephony
services.87 Additionally, the review suggested the
categorical expansion of ONP principles since existing member state regulations were still inappropriate to a European market for voice telephony."" Consequently, the Council of the
European Union decided in June 1993, to abolish
exclusive and special rights for voice-telephony
service providers byJanuary 1, 1998.89 The Council's resolution acknowledged that there are less
restrictive means than the grant of special or exclusive rights to insure the provision of voice telephony as a service of general economic interest.9 0 In addition, recognizing that monopoly
provision of network infrastructure could impede
the ONP goal of European universal service and
interconnection,9 1 the Council directed that a
Green Paper be published to determine whether
the derogation for infrastructure should also be
lifted.9 2

C.

See Commission Directive 90/388, supra note. 35, at 16.
See Commission Communication of 21 October 1992
on the Situation in the Telecommunications Services Sector
(SEC(92) 1048).
87
See European Commission, supra note 84, at 3. The
European Commission had justified special rights for voice
telephony to safeguard monopolies' ability to invest in new
generations of telecom infrastructure. Packet-switching and
other advanced methods of distributing voice-telephony services were now becoming more commonplace. See MosTESHAR, supra note 28, at 60-61 n.133.
88
See European Commission, supra note 84, at 3.
89 See Council Resolution of 22 July 1993 on the Review
of the Situation in the Telecommunications Sector and the
Need for Further Development in that Market, 1993 O.J. (C
213) 3.

White House Virtual Library (visited Jan. 1, 1997) <http://
library.whitehouse.gov/Retrieveplain.cgi?dbtype=text&
id=218&query= Technology+ for+Americas+Economic+
Growth>.
94 See Pomerantz, supra note 71, at 809.
95 See President Outlines Comprehensive New Technology Initiative, supra note 93 (explaining that the purpose of the NII
initiative is to facilitate development of a global information
network, colloquially known as the "information superhighway").
96 See Coy, supra note 44, at 82.
97 Notes from How Technology is Reshaping-Financeand Financial Markets, a conference at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., June 11-12, 1996 (testimony of Graham Albutt,
Chief Information Officer and Executive Vice President,
Reuters America Holdings, June 11, 1996) (on file with the
author).
98 See Coy, supra note 44, at 82.
99 Convergence is the combination of both new and existing media . . . "e.g., broadcasting, cable, fiber optics, satellite" into one integrated system for delivery of video, voice
and data. Botein, supranote 73, at 481. This "integrated sys-

85

86

90
9'

Id. at 2.
Id.

Id. at 3.
See President Outlines Comprehensive New Technology
Initiative: Technology to Create Jobs, Protect the Environment,
Improve Government. Bold Changes Proposed to Redirect, Focus
US. Efforts, White House Press Release of February 22, 1993,
92
9

By 1993, the Clinton Administration began to
emphasize a dual agenda in regard to telecom
policy, both in the introduction of the National
Information Infrastructure ("NII") 93 initiative and
in the Administration's contention that anti-trust
enforcement in the telecom sector would remain
a priority.9 4 The NII initiative emphasized three
closely related elements for the future of U.S.
telecom policy: (1) the realization of sufficient
capacity in a network infrastructure, (2) improvement of accessibility to that infrastructure and (3)
the development of applications to be carried
over information networks.95
Whereas interconnection and ' compatibility
concerns loomed large on the agenda or the EC,
a key stumbling block to pursuing the NII initiative was the prohibitive cost of infrastructure capacity. While traditional circuits that make up the
vast expanse of telecom in the United States are
more than adequate for voice telephony, the
2,400-bits-per-second-speed of many circuits is too
slow for Internet browsing,96 a quandary that the
97
British have dubbed the "World-Wide Wait."
The prohibitive cost of upgrading technology in
the United States to optical fiber (roughly $1,000
per household in 1993) had consigned many
companies to wringing higher speeds out of existing wire and circuits,98 making the second of
the NII goals perhaps the toughest to meet.
With the convergence 9 9 of the telecom, infor-
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mation technology, and software industries, mergers in the telecom and computer industries were
becoming more lucrative, prompting administration concerns that such mergers would cause the
extension of dominance from one market into another.' 0 In response, the Administration vowed
to seek "appropriate conditions that will remove
the anticompetitive effects"1oi of horizontal or
vertical integrations 0 2 involving the telecom industry. However, vertical integrations in recent
years were largely viewed as efficient and pro-competitive. Thus, few were challenged by the DOJ
before 1994.ios Affirming this belief and recognizing that NII principles would benefit from increased investment and access to foreign markets,
in April 1994, the Clinton Administration agreed
to participate in the Negotiating Group on Basic
Telecom ("NGBT") promising to allow greater
foreign investment in U.S. telecom for businesses
of countries that invited similar openness.10 4
In the interim between establishing the 1998
services-liberalization deadline and the publication of the proposed Green Paper, the European
Commission issued two reports. Each report allied the agenda of competitive universal service
through liberalization to the "Information Society." 1 5 Both the report on Europe and the
Global Information Society ("Bangemann Report") 106 and the Delors White Paper on Growth,
Competitiveness and Employment' 0 7 recognized

that the information sector was already developing on its own, representing "nearly $600 billion
in the European Union alone," a prospected
growth "to $3 trillion by the end of the decade,"
and encompassing more than 60% of all jobs in
the EC by the year 2000.108 As in the United
States, the reality of a converging marketplace was
strongly influencing telecom policy development.10 9 For these reasons, the issue of convergence has become a pillar of EC telecom policy,
and subsequent priorities for the application of
competition law to the telecom sector reflect this
deference.
In the near term, the European Action Plan,' 10
submitted concurrently with the Bangemann Report, placed a high priority on accelerated liberalization of telecom infrastructure as a necessity for
the development of the information society.' 1
Subsequently, following the submission by the European Commission of Part One of the Green Paper on the Liberalization of Telecommunications
Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks
("Green Paper on Liberalization"),' 1 2 and based
upon its recommendations, the Council of the European Union quickly issued a resolution in December 1994, calling for the liberalization of infrastructure commensurate with the January 1,
1 13
1998 deadline for voice-telephony services.
Part II of the Green Paper on Liberalization

tem" is a key component of the information superhighway.
100 See Pomerantz, supra note 71, at 810.

agreed to competition in basic telecom services "equivalent
in openness" to the U.S. offer. Id. at 11, 14.
105
Ungerer, supra note 51, at 1112.
106
Id.
107
See generally Commission of the European Community, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment - The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century, White Paper
from the Commission to the Council, COM(93) 700 final
(Dec. 1993).
108
Ungerer, supra note 51, at 1113.
109 It was also leading to some 'turf battles' as Directorates-General IV, X and XIII (responsible for competition, information and culture, and telecommunications, respectively) vied for responsibility over convergence issues. See EC
Directorates Bid for Multimedia Powers, NEW MEDIA MKTs., Apr.
4, 1996.
110 See generally Commission of the European Community, Europe's Way to the Information Society, an Action
Plan: from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, COM(94) 347 Final (Oct. 1994).
111 See Ungerer, supra note 51, at 1115.
112
See Part One of the Green Paper on the Liberalization of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks, COM(94) 440 (Oct. 25, 1994).
113 See Council Resolution of 22 December 1994 on the
Principles and Timetable for the Liberalization of Telecommunications Infrastructure, 1994 O.J. (C 379) 4.

101

Id.

102 Horizontal integrations are mergers of two firms in
the same line of business, "i.e., competitors, whereas vertical
integrations are mergers of two firms that are supplier and
customer". GRAHAM BANNOCK, R.E. BAXTER AND EVAN DAVIS,
THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF ECONOMics 283 (5th ed. 1992).
03
See Pomerantz, supra note 71, at 831. Such beneficial
vertical integrations are often joint-ventures or "partial-mergers," created for the purpose of "produc[ing] or distributing
a .

.

. product in a way that has not been done before, to

engage in joint research that neither [partner] is likely to do
alone, or to share risks." William M. Landes, Harm to Competition: Cartels, Mergers, andjoint Ventures, in ANTITRUST POLICY IN
TRANSITION: THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND ECONOMics 77-78
(Eleanor M. Fox and James T. Halverson, eds. 1984).
104
See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Commerce,
Trade & Hazardous Materials of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 104-89, May
9, 1996 (testimony of International Telecommunications Ambassador Jeffrey M. Lang) at 11. The NGBT was formed following signing of the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") and formation of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") at the conclusion of the Uruguay
round agreements. NGBT talks had been extended until
February 15, 1997, and as of April 9, 1996, eleven nations had
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("Part II"),114 released on January 25, 1995, specifically addressed the particular regulatory framework necessary' 1 5 to encourage competition without damaging prospects for universal service. In
as much as Part II provided a comprehensive picture of how regulatory harmonization would both
facilitate and coexist with infrastructure liberalization, it provides a blueprint for further EC
telecom development.
The primary recommendation of Part II is for
the "[r] emoval of special and exclusive rights over
infrastructure for the provision of telecom services."16 Foreshadowing full liberalization, the li-

censing and authorization schemes necessary for
the provision of alternative infrastructure' 1 7 are to
be tabled by 1996.118 Second, Part II provides
that the Commission will propose a common
framework to transparently set reasonable costs
for member states to meet the universal service
obligation.1 19 Third, Part II envisions a common
European regulatory framework for the awarding
of, criteria for, and conditions attached to the
awarding of licenses for infrastructure. 12 0 And finally, recognizing that telecom services will still initially be provided through "dominant [infrastructure] operators controlling bottleneck facilities,"
extensive monitoring will need to be engaged in
for the short-term to insure adequate enforcement of competition rules. 121 In keeping with the
Bangemann Report and Delors White Paper agendas, Part II also frames its recommendations
under the rubric of a developing European Information Society.' 2 2

See COM(94) 682, supra note 15.
See Council Resolution, supra note 113, at 4-5 (explaining that if the Commission was going to lift the derogation it had upheld for the provision of infrastructure in the
1990 Competition in Services Directive, it would insist on a
comprehensive plan for regulatory implementation to address the universal service concern).
116
COM(94) 682, supra note 15, at 116.
117
Alternative infrastructure includes the use of available television cable networks, energy supply networks and
railway power cables for telecommunications services. See The
Information Society, infra note 123, at 11.
11s
See COM(94) 682, supra note 15, at 116.
119 Id. at 119-20 (the costs of particular concern were
those for interconnection and interoperability of infrastructure).
114

115

II.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Why are Global Alliances Forming?

81

The telecom policy goals of both the United
States and the EC can be jointly characterized as
pursuing improved services and technology
through competition in the marketplace while insuring the public interest in universal service.
However, as each government is operating in a
different stage of telecom-market development,
the legislative agendas of each are different in
meeting that common goal. Having reached a
competitive turning-point in 1984, the United
States benefits from a "single system of [inter-state
regulatory] standards"1 2 3 promulgated by the
FCC, a distinct advantage in facilitating uniform
market development in a liberalized marketplace.
In contrast, among member states of the EC, only
the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark operate liberalized telecom markets. 124 In addition,
the process of pan-European regulatory harmonization which began with implementation of the
ONP Framework Directive in 1990, will stop short
of creating a single European "FCC" to facilitate
its implementation.125 In 1994, the United States
also was moving rapidly toward implementing legislation to allow long-distance companies, BOCs
and cable operators to compete for provision of
telecom services.12 6 For these reasons, the United
States was perceived as going further than any
other major nation to facilitate the building of information-super highway infrastructure through

Id. at 120-22.
Id. at 122-23.
122
Id. at vi-vii.
123
European Commission, Directorate General XIII for
Information, Communications and Culture, The Information
Society 5, ISBN 92-827-6238-6 (1996) [hereinafter The Information Society].
124 Cane, supra note 25, at 1.
125 Less Prospect of EU Action on pan-European
Regulator,
FINTECH TELECOM MKTs., Mar. 14, 1996 (explaining that a
study commissioned by DG-IV recommended more immediate emphasis on encouraging cooperation between member
state regulatory agencies than creation of a single European
regulator).
126
See infra text accompanying notes 260-263.
120
121

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

82

[Vol. 5

advanced-stage telecom deregulation.12 7
Despite differences in the competitive stages of
the markets, both the EC and the United States
will achieve similar goals through competition.
The competitive opening of telecom markets
means not only faster networks, better services
and lower prices' 2 8 but also a wider choice of suppliers, products and services. 12 9 By combining the,
creation of a transparent and standardized regulatory environment with the 1998 deadline for liberalization, the EC is insuring that present memberstate monopolies will not "crush competition
before it starts." 3 0 However, as a consequence,
incumbent monopolies like DT and FT will be hit
with decreasing profits as ensuing competition
and lower technology costs drive down prices and
profit margins.' 3 ' Whereas smaller carriers have
commonly resorted to strategic alliances with
larger competitors to shore up market position in
a domestic market,' 32 in anticipation of 1998,
large carriers like DT and FT are now seeking alliances to expand abroad and provide new services,
while defending their traditional markets.' 3 Similarly in the United States, legislation 3 4 provoked Sprint, MCI, AT&T and the BOCs to not
only defend their long-distance and local-calling
markets, respectively but also to seek alliances to
enter new markets and develop convergence
products utilizing a telecom conduit. Despite that
a decade of competition in the U.S. long-distance
market has honed the marketing and research
and development skills of carriers like Sprint, 3 5

in some respects they are particularly vulnerable.13 6 While Sprint could seemingly enter -the
deregulated local-calling market immediately, -it
would take two to three years and huge investment to make the local connections.1 3 7 By contrast, once FCC approval has been received, the
BOCs would be poised to immediately resell existing long-distance capacity already available at a
30 to 60% discount,13 8 despite their lack of competitive experience. In .the upcoming legislative
environment, alliances would provide the BOCs
and long-distance carriers like Sprint access both
to new markets and the necessary investment capital to improve domestic competitiveness.
The new global market that DT, FT, Sprint and
their counterparts seek to reap benefits from is
the market for telecom services for multinational
businesses. However, most global companies prefer to deal with one company to service all of their
telecom needs,1 39 allowing for the streamlining of
communications and cutting costs.140 No single
domestic carrier, however, in either the United
States or the EC has the combined strengths of
geographic reach, resources and skills to meet the
full range of customer expectations in the $10 bil41
lion per-year multinational-business market.
Therefore, strategic alliances are a necessity.

Arnst and Mandel, supra note 21, at 64.
Telecommunications,CREDIT SUISSE WORLD INDUS. REP.
8, Aug. 1, 1996, at *2.
129 Alan Cane and David Owen, A Clear Line to Europe,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1996, at 21.
130
Tarjanne, supra note 26 (explaining that monopolies
would otherwise fail to provide necessary leased lines or
charge exorbitant interconnection fees to potential competitors).
131 See Alan Cane, Era of the Supercarrier,FIN. TIMEs, Sept.
27, 1996, at 17. Any incumbent telecom operator faced with
full competition can expect to lose between 25 to 30% of its
market share over a ten-year period. See Cane and Owen,
supra note 129, at 21.
132
KORAH, supra note 54, at 9.
1ss
Telecommunications, supra note 128, at *2.
134
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. '151) [hereinafter TelecommunicationsAct].
135
Technological progress achieved by long-distance
carriers has also led to a dramatic increase in network capacity, making it easier for newcomers to enter the market by
reselling this capacity. See Telecommunications, supra note 128,
at *3.

Arnst and Mandel, supra note 21, at 66.
Catherine Arnst, The Giants Aren't Sleeping, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 8, 1996, at 72 (explaining that as each BOC controls
only one network per region of the United States, there is
less excess capacity available for long-distance carriers to resell, and as a result, long-distance carriers can expect to initially offer no more than a 5 to 20% discount on resold local
capacity). Hypothetically, it would take AT&T alone nearly
$5 billion and 10 years to run its own lines to only the top 50
U.S. local markets. Id.
138
Id. However, years of operating in local monopoly
markets have left the BOCs with outmoded networks and
poor competitive skills; $170 billion has been spent by the
BOCs since 1984 simply maintaining existing network technology. Arnst and Mandel, supra note 21, at 66.
139 See MOSTESHAR, supra note 28, at 9.
140
Multinational corporations demand such services as:
"worldwide availability of services with uniform network functionality; flexible billing, allowing the customer to decide the
most appropriate billing breakdown; and the ability to monitor network traffic, faults and performance." Cane, supra
note 131, 1996, at 17.
141
Id.
142
See supra note 64 (explaining the meaning of notifica-

127

128

B.

The Predecessors

In mid-1993, British Telecommunications
("BT") and MCI notifiedl 4 2 the European Com136
137
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mission of their intention to enter into a strategic
alliance.1 43 The primary components of the alliance were two-fold. First, BT would invest $4.3
billion in MCI, taking 20% of the company, with
appropriate board representation as the largest
single shareholder.14 4 Second,. a separate jointventure company, Concert, would be created,
75.1% owned by BT and 24.9% owned by MCI. 145
Under their agreement, BT and MCI would each
contribute their international network facilities
and outsourcing business, as well as appropriately
consolidate their holdings in other world telecom
organizations. 146 In creating Concert, BT and
MCI would be able to offer new, global services to
customers quickly and cheaply.1 47 Of particular
interest, BT and MCI could consolidate the risk in
providing more advanced services (particularly
enhanced and value-added 48 services) on the
large scale required by multinational companies
and other large international users. 4 9
In regard to BT's 20% investment stake in MCI,
the European Commission granted a negative
clearance (authorization) under competition
rules.' 50 In that BT and MCI were and would continue to be competitors as well as joint venturers,
the Commission additionally ruled that the creation of Concert would fall under Article 85(1) of
the Treaty of Rome and Article 53(1) of the EEA
Agreement. 5 1 However, the Commission was
particularly troubled by two provisions in the
agreement: one, which made BT the exclusive
provider of Concert services in the EC, and a second, which kept MCI from entering into certain
sectors of the EC market not addressed by Concert.15 2 Apart from initially granting Concert an
exemption under Article 85(3),'15 the Commistion).
143 Commission Decision (94/579/EC) on BT-MCI
(Case IV/34.857), 1994 O.J. (L 223) 36 [hereinafter Commission Decision on BT-MCIJ]. Having received notice from the
Commission that the alliance did not constitute a "concentration" pursuant to regulation No. 4064/89, the partners converted the notice into a request for negative clearance and/
or exemption pursuant to Regulation 17. Id.
144
Alan Cane, Stealing a March on Its Rivals, FIN. TIMEs 2,
Sept. 19, 1996.
1"5

Id.

Ungerer, supra note 51, at 1151 (explaining that MCI
acquired most of BT's existing business in North America).
147
See Commission Decision on BT-MC, supra note 143, at
50.
148 Value-added services rely on digital technology to manipulate data, as they are largely outgrowths of the use of
computers as telecom tools. See Testimony of Ambassador
Jeffrey M. Lang, supra note 104, at 12.
.146

83

sion also granted BT and MCI individual exemptions only after the parties agreed to lift the restriction on MCI's access to the EC within five
years and to provide that EC customers could obtain Concert services via MCI without unreasonable burden. 1 5 4 However, the likelihood of European customers demanding Concert services
explicitly through MCI mitigates the significance
of this Commission concern.
Reflecting the Clinton administration's concern over foreign market access,' 5 5 the U.S. DOJ
challenged BT's 20% acquisition of MCI under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.' 5 6 The DOJ argued
that as the dominant telecom provider in the
United Kingdom BT could discriminate in favor
of MCI with respect to prices, terms and access to
BT's international services, effectively diminishing
the ability of MCI's competitors to offer similar
services.15 7 In addition, in providing transatlantic
services to MCI's competitors, BT would be in a
position to provide MCI with proprietary information about its competitors.15 As a result, in its Final Judgment, conditionally approving the alliance, DOJ ordered BT and MCI to disclose
detailed information regarding terms, conditions
and prices for BT services provided to MCI.'5 9 In
addition, BT was forbidden from disclosing to
MCI any proprietary information regarding MCI's
60
competitors.
Even though the United States and United
Kingdom markets are considered open and competitive, the Concert alliance is presently the only
venture with full regulatory clearance from both
the EC and United States.16 ' However, that full
approval will likely be tested if BT completes a

149

See Commission Decision on BT-MCI, supra note 143, at

49.
150 Id. (explaining that the principle reason for granting
clearance was because the joint-venture agreement stipulated
that BT could not "seek to control or influence" MCI).
151
Id. at 49.
152
Id. at 53.
'53
Id. at 49.
154
Id. at 54 (explaining that the alliance would be approved only for a period of five years, at which time it will be
reviewed for its competitive influence).
155
See supra text accompanying note 104.
156
United States v. MCI Comm. Corp., 59 Fed. Reg.
33,009, 33,016 (1994) (Competitive Impact Statement).
157
Id. at 33,017.
158
159
160

161

Id.
Id. at 33,011.
Id. at 33,012.

Cane, supra note 144, at 2.
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contemplated full buyout of MCI.16 2 In a deal announced on November 2, 1996, BT would
purchase the remaining 80% of MCI for approximately $22 billion, making the combined company the third largest in the world.' 6 3 Importantly, the deal would consolidate the partners'
sales organizations, whereas Concert services are
presently offered individually by the partners.16 4
In a related case involving AT&T, the European
Commission, of its own initiation, opened investigations in April 1995 on the alliance of
Unisource/Uniworld.1 65 Unisource is ajoint-venture involving Telia of Sweden, PTT Telecom
Netherlands and Swiss PTT Telecom.1 6 6 In mid1995, the EC had agreed to allow AT&T to join
with Unisource in the provision of voice services
but not data or messaging, and this first-stage
joint-venture was termed Uniworld.16 7 The Commission is currently investigating the new company called AT&T-Unisource Services for its possible anti-competitive effect. Unisource owns 60%
and AT&T owns 40%.168 Like Concert, the purpose of the alliance is to combine the partners'

existing liberalized services directed to target mul1 69
tinational corporate customers.s

162 Mark Landler, A British Company Weighs Buying MCI in
$22 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1996, at 1. "Federal law
prohibits foreign companies from owning more than 25% of
an American phone company." Concert had been given a
waiver for BT to extend its investment in MCI to 35%, but
the FCC will likely analyze the United Kingdom market for
reciprocity with the United States to determine if it is in the
public interest to lift the cap entirely. Id. at 1, 38.
Id. The full merger will also provide MCI with bil163
lions in additional capital and BT's expertise running local
networks in Britain, crucial advantages as MCI tries to enter
the U.S. local calling market. SeeJulia Flynn, Stanley Reed
and Amy Barrett, Worldphone Inc.?, Bus. WK., Nov. 18, 1996, at
54.
A crucial aspect to the success of an international
164
joint-venture involves the merging of sales organizations to
facilitate the marketing of global services. See Landes, supra
note 103, at 77-78.
165 See Ungerer, supra note 51, at 1162.
166
See AT&T, Unisource Merge European Services - but
Need Approval, FINTECH TELECOM MKTS., May 23, 1996.
Spain's state-owned telecom company Telefonica was slated
to join Uniworld, but since it has postponed liberalization
until 2000, prospects for EC approval of its joining the alliance are doubtful. See Michael Lindemann, Tensions Hard to

the profits from new businesses that they introduce into the
venture. See Lindemann, supra note 166, at 2. In addition,
decision making in Uniworld has been hampered by its
multi-alliance power structure, which has been compared to
a "United Nations type arrangement." Id. Some have predicted that in the wake of strong alliances such as Global One
and the impending BT-MCI merger, AT&T's expansion strategy must go beyond the loose Unisource/Uniworld alliance
or risk falling apart. See John J. Keller, BT-MCI Merger Reshapes Telecom Industry, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1996, at BI.
170
Notification of ajoint Venture (Case No IV/35.337Atlas), 1994 O.J. (C 377) 9. Such notifications, pursuant to
Article 4 of Council Regulation 17, must be filed one week
after the conclusion of an agreement and that the Commission is bound by Article 11(3) (b) (i) of the EEC-U.S. Cooperation Agreement to inform the U.S. DOJ and FTC of the notice. Frank L. Fine, MERCERS AND JOINT VENTURES IN EUROPE:
THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE EEC 260-61 (1994).
171
III. Business Brief Competition: Commission Finally Clears
Atlas Global One Telecoms Deal, EUR. REP. No. 2150, (July 20,
1996), at 2 [hereinafter Business Brief].
172
See supra text accompanying notes 26, 38, and 124; see
also Appendix I, Figure 2.
173 James Pressley, Trade & Politics:EU May Block Telecom
Deal Between France, Germany, WALL ST. J. EuR., Feb. 28, 1995,
at 6. BT had the singular distinction of being the largest
telecom carrier in the Community to be operating in a market that had already undergone liberalization-the United
Kingdom. See Commission Decision on BT-MC1, supra note 143,
at 37.
174
See Pressley, supra note 173, at 6.
175
Id.
176
See Pressley, supra note 173, at 6. To illustrate the
point, the Commission released figures showing that while
the European market for data transmission was worth Ecu3
billion in 1993, France accounted for 25% and Germany 18%

Avoid, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1996, at 2.
167
See AT&T, Unisource Merge European Services, supra
note 166.
168 Id. Although "already providing services to customers," AT&T-Unisource has yet to receive regulatory approval
from the EC "because the markets of its European parents
are not yet liberalized." David Owen and Alan Cane, AT&T
Alliance Bids for French Telecoms Network, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1996, at 14.
Id. Relations between the Uniworld partners have be169
come complicated recently because each partner gets to keep

1. Phase One - Atlas is Notified to the Commission
When Deutsche Telekom ("DT") and France
Telecom ("FT") first notified17 0 the European
Commission of their intent to form the Atlas strategic alliance on December 16, 1994,171 each company was a state-owned monopoly provider of
telecom infrastructure and services and enjoyed
special and exclusive rights for the provision of
each.17 2 For these reasons, BT had lodged a preliminary complaint with the Commission in regard to Atlas1 73 even before the public comment
period on the notice began.' 7 4 In the interim,
Karel Van Miert, Commissioner of DirectorateGeneral IV on Competition, began pressing DT
and FT for additional information on their agreement.175 Van Miert expressed the Commission's
deep concern that the venture would give DT and
FT a dominant position in the European market
76
for voice and data services for business clients.'
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The European Commission had been aware of
plans by DT and FT to include the third largest.
U.S. long-distance carrier, Sprint Corp. in a sepaEven with
rate joint-venture since June 1994.'
the Sprint dimension in mind, 7 8 Van Miert suggested that if the German and French governments would agree to allow cable companies and
other alternative carriers to provide any liberalized phone services ahead of the newly established 1998 deadline,17 9 it would significantly help
the Atlas cause. 8 0
When German Post and Telecommunications
Minister Wolfgang Botsch proposed on January
31, 1995, to speed up the German liberalization
process ahead of the 1998 deadline,' 8 ' DT
strongly opposed the move, calling the terms "too
favorable towards competitors."18 2 Although DT's
sentiment should seemingly have dampened prospects for European Commission approval, German and U.S. officials had already quietly begun
high-level meetings on the subject of Atlas.x183
Concluding a two-month preliminary assessment of Atlas on May 5, 1995, the European Commission issued a formal warning letter to DT and
FT on May 23, detailing concerns and objections. 1 8 4 In addition to being as yet unable to
come to a definitive agreement with Sprint, the
Atlas partners received the Commission's warning
that it may block the joint venture, 8 5 particularly
because the high market share of DT and FT in

their home countries would crowd out the choice
of services for small businesses.18 6
On June 22, 1995, after a year of negotiations,
DT and FT signed an agreement in New York to
8 7 The
pay $4.1 billion to acquire 20% of Sprint.1
proposed joint-venture, dubbed Phoenix, would
benefit from the already strong international
presence of the three companies, with offices in
fifty countries and 2,000 venture-dedicated employees world-wide.' 8 Unlike Concert and
AT&T-Unisource, which were each aiming singularly at the business market, Phoenix would be
ambitiously pursuing a three-market offensive
aimed at businesses, consumer carriers and consumer services.s Phoenix products would be distributed by DT and FT in France and Germany, by
Sprint in the United States and by the "Rest of Europe/World" Phoenix operating group else-

of that amount. Caroline Southey, Van Miert Voices Doubts over
Franco-German Telecom Plan, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1995, at 6.
177 Douglas Lavin, EU Warns Paris,Bonn on Planfor Phone
Links, WALL ST. J. EUR., May 26-27, 1995, at 4.
178 The Commission had often expressed that it would
be much more willing to grant Atlas an Article 85 exemption
if it had an international partner, particularly one from the
United States. See infra text accompanying note 289.
179
See supra text accompanying note 113.
180 See Pressley, supra note 173, at 6.
181
Gail Edmonson, Karen Lowry-Miller, Julia Flynn and
Mark Lewyn, Bonn's. Telecom Bombshell: Breaking DT's Monopoly
will have Huge Repercussions, Bus. WK., Feb. 13, 1995, at 22.
Many insiders claimed that B6tsch vowed behind closed
doors to do much more; by allowing business clients access to
alternative carriers and newer high-tech services by summer,
1995, B6tsch would break the DT rate which could be as
much as 300% higher than that in the United Kingdom for
similar services, yet preserve DT's voice monopoly, appeasing
German labor. Id.
182 Deutsche Telekom Against German Liberalization Plans,
MULTINATIONAL SERV., May 6, 1995.
183 Liberalization Needed for Atlas, Bangemann Says, WALL
ST. J. EUR., Mar. 10, 1995, at 6. The purpose of the U.S.German meetings "was to make it abundantly clear" that the
United States would only clear Sprint involvement in Atlas if
Germany would liberalize its telephone and network monop-

olies. Id.
184 Business Brief supra note 171, at 2.
185
Douglas Lavin, EU Warns Paris, Bonn on Planfor Phone
Links, WALL ST.J. EUR., May 26, 1995, at 4.
186 Emma Tucker, Brussels Seeks Wider Competition Powers,
FIN. TIMES, May 25, 1995, at 2.
187 Gautum Naik, Sprint Signs $4.1 Billion Agreement with
French, German Phone Carriers,WALL ST. J., June 23, 1995, at
B2. If Sprint decided to sell its cellular subsidiary before the
deal was finalized, the price would go down to $3.5 billion.
Id.
188 Id. Annual start-up revenues were then estimated at
$500 million. Id.
189 Id.
190 Notification of a Joint Venture (Case No IV/35.617
- Phoenix), 1995 O.J. (C 184) 11 (July 18, 1995) [hereinafter Notice]. Phoenix would provide calling card services for
travelers and global telecom service for multinational business, including: data network services, virtual private networks, customized networks, and outsourcing and VSAT services. Id. Importantly, the global sales and marketing
organizations of the partners would be consolidated under
the Rest of Europe/World operating group, whereas Concert
services are presently provided and marketed separately by
BT and MCI. See supra note 164.
191 See Notice, supra note 190, at 11.

where. 190

2. Phase Two Commission

Phoenix is Notified to the

On June 29, DT, FT and Sprint officially notified the preliminary Phoenix agreements to the
Commission.' 9 ' In a gesture aimed at easing the
European Commission's anti-competitive fears regarding DT and FT, the partners submitted a list
of proposed concessions on Atlas. The concessions included DT's sale of its 23.3% stake in In-
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fonet ' Services Corporation (ISC), Los Angeles
and its 80% stake in Infonet Services Deutschland
GmbH, Frankfurt,' 9 2 freeing-up the private international data network which would have otherwise been eliminated as a market competitor by
the venture.
Despite initial concessions and the fact that the
addition of Sprint provided the global dimension
to the joint-venture that the European Commission preferred,19 3 Van Miert sent stern warning
letters to the German and French telecom ministers and the CEOs of the three companies. 19 4 Addressing continuing concerns regarding the Atlas
portion of the alliance, Van Miert gave DT and FT
until September 15 to make changes to the structure of the venture and reiterated that Atlas
would only be approved if both the German and
French governments agreed to allow competitive
access to the national infrastructure for data transmission. 195
Meanwhile, on July 13, the DOJ filed a draft
consent decree proposing clearance of Phoenix
subject to extensive structural and behavioral conditions.19 6 The restrictions DOJ proposed to apply to Phoenix were conditioned on the German
and French governments opening their markets
to competition by 1998. Without application of
the restrictions, DOJ contended, the proposed
venture would constitute a violation of Section 7
of the Clayton Act,'9 7 lessening competition both
in the provision of international telecom services
between the United States and Germany, and the
United States and France, and in the provision of
seamless international telecom services.19 8
To alleviate possible anti-competitive affects of
the alliance, the DOJ's proposed authorization of
Phoenix divided consent into two phases.' 9 9 The
first phase would commence with adoption of the
Telekom verkauft Infonet-Anteile, FRANKFURTER
at 14.
Sets Atlas Deadline, FIN.
TIMES, July 19, 1995, at 2 (explaining that Van Miert was previously concerned that Atlas would not be in a position to
address the global needs of multinational companies, as Concert would be); see also infra text accompanying note 289.
194
See Business Brief supra note 171, at 2.
195
See Tucker, supra note 193.
196
See Business Brief supra note 171.
197
United States v. Sprint Corp. and Joint Venture Co.,
Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,049 (Aug. 24, 1995).
198
Id. at 44,058 (Competitive Impact Statement).
192

ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, July 27, 1995,
193
Emma Tucker, Van Miert

199

Id. at 44,049.

200

Id. at 44,056.
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consent decree and FCC approval of Phoenix and
would end with Germany and France complying
with the EC January 1, 1998 deadline for market
liberalization. 200 During the first phase, Sprint
would be prohibited from providing services in
which DT or FT have special rights, except in limited non-exclusive circumstances, 20 1 nor could
Sprint own or control public data networks in
France or Germany. 2 02 In addition, Sprint would
not be allowed to own any assets of DT or FT, nor
be cross-subsidized by them. 2 03 Finally, during
phase one, neither Sprint nor Phoenix can benefit from discriminatory treatment2 0 4 or disproportionate allocation of international traffic by DT or
FT,205 nor could access to the public switched or
data networks of either France or Germany be
limited for Sprint or Phoenix competitors. 206 importantly, approval in the first phase would allow
Sprint to participate in the creation of the separate Phoenix joint-venture company, 207 and as a
result, receive the $4.1 billion in funds that DT
and FT would contribute for a combined 20%
stake in Sprint.
Granting that both Germany and France have
complied with the 1998 EC deadline for liberalization, most of the phase one restrictions on Sprint
and Phoenix will be scaled back, with the exception of extensive reporting requirements. During
phase one and continuing through phase two,
which effectively would begin on January 1,
1998,208 DT and FT's prices and terms of services
to Sprint and Phoenix must be made public. 209
The proposed consent decree will be effective
for five years subsequent to the .start of phase
two. 2 1 0 However, Sprint is prohibited from ever
utilizing its access to FT and DT to obtain proprietary information about its competitors, similar to
a provision in the consent decree for Concert. 2 1 1
201

Id. at 44,053.

202

Id.

Id. at 44,054.
Id. at 44,053.
205
Id. at 44,053.
206
Id. at 44,054.
207
Both DT and FI' must remain separate and distinct
from the separately formed Phoenix, at least until the end of
Phase One. Id.
208
Id. at 44,056.
209
Id. at 44,051. Additionally, each partner in Phoenix
must continue to report accounting, settlement rates, and return traffic methodology as well as any information regarding
their respective network changes. Id. at 44,051-52.
210
Id. at 44,058.
211
Id. at 44,052.
203

204
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Apart from the proposed U.S. consent decree
passing judicial review and a period of public
comment, Phoenix also needed to win approval
from the FCC. While applauding the Clinton Administration's "fair and reasonable" decision to
propose that the venture proceed, 21 2 by late August 1995, DT and FT were attempting to address
some of the changes that Van Miert had demanded by September 15. One concession, sale
of DT's interest in Germany's third-largest carrier,
INFO A.G., was proposed by DT Chairman Ron
Sommer in an August meeting with Van Miert.2 13 .
However, it is likely that Van Miert's more immediate concern was getting the German and French
governments to agree to a timetable for opening
up their markets for alternative infrastructure. 2 1 4
The prospect of early liberalization of a portion of
the market promised greater competitive activity
than a DT concession on a single competitor.
3. Phase Three Finalized

EC and U.S. Opinions are
I

The ice began to break on September 29, 1995,
when French Telecommunications Minister Francois Fillon and B6tsch met with Van Miert and
agreed to open German and French alternative
infrastructure to all liberalized services by July 1,
1996,215 set up independent regulators and allow
competitors fair access to state-owned networks. 2 16 However, it was not until the German
and French Ministers met with Van Miert and the
CEOs of DT and FT on October 17 that a preliminary agreement authorizing Atlas/Phoenix was
212
Alan Cane, Michael Lindemann and Andrew Jack,
Sprint's European Alliance Clears Big U.S. Hurdle, FIN. TIMES.,
July 14, 1995, at 1.
213
Telecommunications: Possible New Concessions from
Deutsche Telekom on Atlas, MULTINATIONAL SERV., Sept. 1,1995.
214
Id. Although France had taken some steps toward
opening up SNCF rail networks for alternative use, German
Telecommunications Minister B6tsch was suggesting in September, 1995, that the original alternative infrastructure
deadline of January 1, 1996 was unrealistic. Id.
215
Telecommunications:France & Germany will Open Infrastructure by July af Atlas Cleared, MULTINATIONAL SERv., Oct. 1,
1995. The meeting was held at the request of both ministers
and was indicative of the importance both governments attached to the Atlas alliance. Id.
216
EU Clears Pathfor Giant Phone Venture, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 17, 1995, at A16.
217
Id.
218
Public Comments and Response on Proposed Final
Judgment, United States v. Sprint Corp. andJoint Venture Co., 61
Fed. Reg. 3,970, 3,975 (Feb. 2, 1996) (citing Ministry of Infor-

87

signed.2 1 7
As the EC gave preliminary approval to Atlas
and Phoenix, the French Direction Generale des
Postes et Telecommunications (DGPT) published
a consultative document outlining the steps to be
taken and timetable for implementation of competition. 2 18 According to the document, the
French government planned in March, 1996, to
introduce reform legislation for the full introduction of competition by 1998.219 In addition, by
the end of 1996, regulations establishing principles for interconnection and licensing of competitors would be put in place. 220 Similar progress
was being made in Germany. The German Government had set out its proposals for liberalization in March 1995 and draft legislation in
June. 2 2 1 The legislation was expected to pass both
houses of the German federal legislature by
Spring 1996, and Germany also expected to be issuing competitive licenses by early 1997.222
Awaiting an EC decision on Atlas and Phoenix,
FCC Chairman Reed Hunt declared that the FCC
would rule on Phoenix approval and related foreign telecom market access concerns in a twostage process by the end of 1995.223 Now that the
EC had made a commitment to pursue an Article
85(3) exemption for both alliances, 2 2 4 the FCC issued the first opinion relating to Phoenix concerns on December 7, 1995.225 Although the
FCC's Report and Order did not speak directly to
the Phoenix venture, it referred to it in adopting
standards for regulating the entry of foreign carriers into the U.S.-international telecom services
market. Acting under its authority to conduct
mation Technology and Postal Services, New Ground Rules
for Telecommunications in France, October, 1995).
219
Id.
220
Id. Licenses would be issued to competing telecom
operators by the Spring of 1997. Id.
221
See Urfited States v. Sprint Corp. and Joint Venture,
supra note 218, at 3,975.
222

Id.

Alan Cane, U.S. Hints it Wants to Give Phoenix Wings,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at 8.
224
See generally Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No. 17 and Article 3 of Protocol 21 of the European Economic Area Agreement concerning a request for
negative clearance or an exemption pursuant to Article 85(3)
of the EC Treaty and Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement Case No. IV/35.337 - Atlas, 1995 O.J. (C 337) 2, 13 (Dec.
15, 1995) [hereinafter Notice, Atlas].
225
See In re Matter of Market Entry and Regulation of ForeignAffiliated Entities, 11 FCC Rcd. 3,873 (Nov. 28, 1995) (Commissioners Barrett and Ness issuing separate statements).
223

88
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public interest analysis, 2 2 6 the FCC developed six
criteria for determining whether a foreign country had effective market access: (1) whether a
U.S. carrier can offer services similar to those that
the foreign entity seeks to offer in the United
States; (2) whether competitive safeguards exist in
the foreign country, including; (3) the availability
bf published charges, terms, and conditions for
interconnection; (4) timely and nondiscriminatory disclosure of technical information needed
for interconnection; (5) and the protection of
carrier proprietary information; and (6) whether
an independent regulatory body with fair and
transparent procedures is established to enforce
competitive standards. 227
A second FCC ruling was adopted on December
15, 1995, and it was directed specifically at the
Phoenix venture.2 2 8 In as much as the equity investments by DT and FT do not result in transfer
of control of Sprint, the FCC ruled that the investment itself does not require prior approval.22 9
However, the fact that both France and Germany
have recently agreed to a timetable for introduction of competition mitigated what would have
been a negative analysis of competitive opportunities under the guidelines published December
7.20 As part of the Declaratory Ruling and Order, the FCC restricted Sprint from operating new
international circuit capacity until liberalization
occurs in the German and French markets. 23 1
Also, as "dominant carrier" with respect to traffic
between the United States and Germany and
France, Sprint will now be required to obtain ap-

proval for any additional circuits to those countries, either for itself or Phoenix.2 3 2 With regard
to traffic or revenue flows, Sprint will not be allowed to accept any "special concessions" from
DT or FT.2 33 Finally, Sprint will have to file sixmonth reports concerning the status of telecom
markets and regulation in Germany and France,
keeping the FCC apprised of liberalization developments. 2 34
On the same day that the FCC opinion was
adopted, the European Commission published a
detailed assessment of its preliminary agreements
on Atlas2 35 and Phoenix.2 3 6 Under changes made
to the original Atlas agreement, Atlas would not
acquire ownership or control of the German and
French low-level public data transfer networks
before the 1998 scheduled liberalization.2 3 7 Additionally, DT would not be able to include INFO
A.G. in the Atlas venture.2 3 8 As monopoly providers, both DT and FT control the public-switched
telecommunications network (PSTN) on which
voice telephony service is dependent, therefore,
the terms and conditions and scope of services
made available to Atlas must be similar to those
made to other providers.2 39 Finally, the preliminary authorization provides that DT and FT could
not engage in cross-subsidization.240
The European Commission's preliminary authorization places fewer restrictions on the Phoenix component of the overall joint-venture, reflecting its previous contention that a global
partner would improve the prospects for Atlas. 2 4 1
The Commission likewise prohibited DT and FT

See generally 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1988).
See In re Matter of Market Entry and Regulation of ForeignAffiliated Entities, supra note 225, at 3889.
228 See In re Matter of Sprint Corp. Petitionfor Declaratoiy
Ruling Concerning Section 310(b)(4) and (d) and the Public Interest Requirements of the Communications Act of 1934, (as
amended, at 11 FCC Rcd. 1,850 (Dec. 15, 1995)).
229 Id. at 1,855-57,
230 Id. at 1,860-61.
231 Id. at 1,868-69 (explaining that Sprint must utilize existing idle capacity it has via several submarine cables until
liberalization in Germany and France allows competition in
services other than public-switched voice, including resale of
international traffic services).
232
Id. at 1,867-68. Sprint had objected to application of
the December 7 guidelines on market access for Foreign Carrier Entry, stating that Sprint's petition for clearance of Phoenix by the FCC had been pending long before the FCC separately adopted final rules in the Foreign Carrier Entry
proceeding; the FCC replied that it was well within its discretion to "apply new rules, and policies to pending matters." Id
at 1,855.
233 Id. at 1869 n.166 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 63.14 (1996)).

234
Id. at 1,871-72. Having found that U.S.-France traffic
accounting rates are 28% higher than those for U.S.-U.K. or
U.S.-German traffic, the FCC also required Sprint to secure
written commitment from FT to lower rates within two years.
Id. at 1,865.
235 See generally Notice, Atlas, supra note 224, at 2.
236
See generally Notice Pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No. 17 and Article 3 of Protocol 21 of the European Economic Area Agreement concerning a request for
negative clearance or an exemption pursuant to Article 85(3)
of the EC Treaty and Article 53(3) of the EEA Agreement Case No. IV/35.617 - Phoenix, 1995 O.J. (C 337) 13 (Dec.
15, 1995) [hereinafter Notice, Phoenix].
237
Id. at 8.
238
Id. at 9-10.
239 Id. at 9. In accordance with the German and French
agreement to open up alternative infrastructure to competition by July 1, 1996, DT and FT must also maintain thirdparty access to their public switched data networks from that
point on. Id. at 10-11.
240 Id. at 10.
241 Despite that DT, FT and Sprint are the second,
fourth and eleventh largest telecom carriers in the world, re-
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from granting any Phoenix-related entities discriminatory terms and conditions or scope of services, 242 as it had in the Atlas opinion. Further,
neither DT or FT or Sprint are allowed to make
use of Phoenix international services by a customer conditional upon purchase of services or
products from any of the partners individually.2 4 3
And finally, with regard to the Phoenix venture,
neither DT nor FT can engage in cross-subsidization, 2 44 as had been prohibited in the Atlas authorization.
As the comment period on DOJ's draft consent
decree had ended on October 23, 1995, a summary of comments and the DOJ response was issued on January 18, 1996.245 The most ardent
criticism of Phoenix authorization by DOJ was
raised by AT&T, MCI, British Telecom North
America, Esprit Telecom and Cable & Wireless.2 4 6
They argued that despite the transition from
phase one to phase two, and the legal removal of
DT and FT's monopoly rights, both companies
will likely still have de-facto market prominence as
competition would take substantial time to develop. 24 7 DOJ responded that the Final Judgment
must be considered in conjunction with parallel
measures being taken by the EC and in Germany
and France.2 4 8 Both Germany and France had
agreed to early liberalization of alternative infrastructure by July 1, allowing potential competitors
the opportunity to establish alternative networks a
full year-and-a-half before the earliest time at
which phase one would conclude.24 9 In addition,
DOJ argued that Germany and France had each
separately begun legislative procedures to insure

that liberalization measures begin before the EC
imposed 1998 deadline. 250 Having responded to
comments, the court adopted the consent decree
on February 16, 1996.251

spectively, in terms of revenue, those distinctions do not necessarily reflect the impact the partners will have in the market for global services. Id. at 13-14; see also Appendix I, Figure
3.
242
See Notice, Phoenix, supra note 235, at 21.

supra note 218, at 3,977.
249
Id.
250
Id. at 3,977-78.
251
Business Brief supra note 171, at 2.
252
Telecommunications: German Proposal on Liberalization,
TECH EUR., Feb. 8, 1996. This legislative effort would be temporarily stymied in early June 1996, when the Supervisory
Board President of DT, Rolf-Dieter Leister resigned amid
government meddling and the German parliament's tabling
of telecom deregulation legislation. Deutsche Telekom Chief Resigns on Rocky Road to Privatization,AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, June
17, 1996.
253
Commission of the European Communities, Proposal
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Interconnection in Telecommunications, COM(95) 379 final, O.J.
(C 313) 7 (Nov. 24, 1995).
254
Id.
255
See generally Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a Common Framework for General Authorizations
and Individual Licenses in the Field of Telecommunications

243
244

Id.
Id.

245
See United States v. Sprint Corp. and Joint Venture,
supra note 218, at 3,977. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1994)) requires a 60-day
public comment period on the submission of a proposed final judgment. Id.
246
Commenters included AT&T, MCI, BT-Amer, Cable
& Wireless, ACC Corp., Esprit Telecom and Professor
Charles M. Haar of the Harvard University Law School. Id.
247
Id. This contention mirrored BT's argument that it
formally submitted to the Commission in early February,
1996, threatening that it might take court action if the Atlas
authorization was not modified. British Telecom Pressures EU
over Ventures, WALL ST. J. EUR., Feb. 7, 1996, at 8.
248
See United States v. Sprint Corp. and Joint Venture,

4.

The Final Chapter - FurtherLegislative
Developments and Phoenix (Global One) is
Finally Approved

On January 30, the German government had in
fact adopted a draft law providing that interested
telecom operators, regardless of size or number,
could'apply for a license to provide telecom services and/or networks, and the dominant company
in control of networks in given areas of Germany
must in turn provide good quality, affordable access. 2 5 2 Paralleling measures at the member-state
level, the European Commission and Council of
the European Union had issued several directives
and draft directives prompting further member
state progress toward compliance with the 1998
liberalization deadline. On July 19, 1995, the
Commission had issued a proposed draft directive
applying ONP principles to the manner in which
monopoly carriers would provide for seamless and
non-discriminatory connection.2 5 3 Under the
proposed directive, DT, FT and other monopoly
carriers, would have to establish transparent, unbundled, cost-oriented interconnection charges
for carriers needing to access network infrastructure for the provision of services. 254 In addition,
in November 1995, the Commission both adopted
a proposed draft directive on licensing25 5 and announced proposed amendments to the original
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ONP Framework Directive. 2 56 Under the draft directive on licensing, member states could not impose limits on the number of licenses granted to
provide particular services or facilities, and procedures adopted for licensing would have to be
open, transparent and non-discriminatory. 25 7
Proposed amendments to the ONP Framework
Directive required that member states retaining a
significant degree of ownership or control of a
telecom provider would have to take additional
measures to insure that regulatory authorities
would be both "legally distinct and functionally independent" of telecom organizations. 25 8 This directive would prove particularly applicable to DT
and FT as neither the German nor French governments had as yet adopted a timetable for public
offerings of the telecom organizations. And finally, reflecting developments achieved through
negotiations with Germany and France, the Commission adopted a Directive on March 13, 1996,
affirming the July 1, 1996 deadline for liberalization of alternative infrastructure and the January
1, 1998 deadline for full liberalization.25 9
Meanwhile, in February President Clinton
signed into law the Telecommunications Act of
1996,260 concluding nearly ten years of negotiations in the U.S. Congress. The Conference Report on the Act states that its objective is "to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of
advanced telecommunications .

.

. by opening all

telecommunications markets to competition." 26 1
Services, COM(95) 545 (Nov. 14, 1995) [hereinafter
COM(95) 5451.
256
See generally Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending Council Directive 90/387/EEC and 92/44/
EEC for the purpose of Adaptation to a Competitive Environment in Telecommunications, COM (95)543 final (Nov. 11,
1995) [hereinafter COM(95) 543].
257
See COM(95) 545, supra note 255, at 3.
258
See COM(95) 543, supra note 256, at 21.
259
See Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March
1996 Amending Directive 90/388/EC with regard to Implementation of Full Competition in Telecommunications Markets, 1996 O.J. (L 74) 13, 21.
260
See Telecommunications Act, supra note 134.
261
H.R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996) reprintedin 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124 (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference).
262
See Telecommunications Act, supra note 134, at § 253.
263
Id. at § 271.
264
Id. at § 254.
265
Id. at §§ 251-52.
266
Id. at §§ 259.
267
See generally Commission Decision of 17 July 1996 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 85 of the EC Treaty and
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The key provisions of the Act include both opening up local telephone service to competition
from, long-distance, companies and cable companies2 6 2 and opening up the long-distance market
to competition from the BOCs. 2 6 3 Additionally,
the Act ordered the FCC to promulgate rules necessary to maintain universal service, 2 6 4 promulgate interconnection and access requirements 265
and the sharing of necessary infrastructure. 2 66
Having renamed the Phoenix venture Global
One on January 22, 1996, DT, FT and Sprint received the final European Commission decision
approving Atlas2 67 and Global One 2 68 on July 17.
In addition to, conditions imposed by the preliminary authorization published in December, in
granting an Article 85(3) exemption, the Commission would only approve Atlas for five years.26 9
In 2001 the Commission will review the Atlas venture for possible anti-competitive effects, the same
time at which a similar review will be conducted
for Concert. 270 During phase one of the opinion,
Atlas/Global One will be precluded from offering
global or value-added services until Germany and
France have granted the first two alternative
telecom infrastructure licenses. 2 7 1 At phase two,
DT and FT may incorporate into Atlas their national public switched data networks only if both
Germany and France have fully liberalized all
telecom services, including public voice and all
network infrastructure.27 2 In regard to all services
offered or infrastructure controlled by Atlas/
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/35.337 - Atlas), 1996 O.J. (L 239) 23 [hereinafter Commission Decision,
Atlas].
268
See generally Commission Decision of 17 July 1996 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 85 of the EC Treaty and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/35.617 - Phoenix/Global One), 1996 O.J. (L 239) 57 [hereinafter Commission Decision, Phoenix].
269
See Commission Decision, Atlas, supra note 267, at 50.
Phoenix would be similarly authorized for an initial period of
only seven years. See Commission Decision, Phoenix, supra note
268, at 74 (explaining that as the European market is in a
period of fast change, Atlas' competitive impact would need
to be analyzed sooner).
270
See Commission Decision, Atlas, supra note 267, at 50
(explaining that DT and FT may request review of specific
provisions of the Decision once both the German and French
legislative agendas for liberalization are fully in place).
271
Id. at 51 (explaining that fulfillment of this condition
was immanent as both the German and French legislatures
had passed legislation implementing the agreed-to timetable
for alternative infrastructure and non-voice services liberalization byJuly 1, 1996).
272

Id.
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Global One, the co-venturers and joint-venture
companies must allow non-discriminatory access
and interconnection to all third party competitors.2 7 3

91

The rapidly changing global telecom marketplace of the past decade has set in motion several
high-profile global joint-ventures between firms
that in many cases were perceived as monopolies
in their home countries. However, the unique nature of Atlas/Global One is the EC and United
States were able to use authorization of the alliance not only to advance the goals of the individual partners, but also to create opportunities for
competitors in open French and German markets, furthering key EC and U.S. telecom policy
goals.
The pivotal element of the alliance for the Clinton Administration proved to be the leverage that
could be utilized in weighing approval of Global
One against Germany and France's commitment
to open their telecom markets. 2 7 4 From the earliest days of 1995, when Atlas was being solely considered by the EC, the United States made it clear
that Sprint would only be allowed to join DT and
FT if the German and French governments
agreed to the EC 1998 deadline for full liberalization. 275 Most recently, when interconnection reg-

ulations were temporarily stalled in the
Bundesrat, German officials feared that the FCC
would exert pressure to resolve the dispute,
prompting Telekom Minister Botsch to state publicly that he would travel to the United States and
speak on behalf of DT and German liberalization
if necessary.2 76 The closed nature of the German
and French markets had provided the United
States with the basis for anti-trust objections to the
alliance.2 77 In addition, however, the unique status of the joint-venture partners as state-owned
monopolies gave the DOJ and the FCC the opportunity to address market access issues both specifically, and generally in regard to Germany and
France. 2 7 8 When Germany and France did finally
agree to an expedited liberalization timetable,2 79
the opening of both markets could be foreseen as
beneficial to U.S. policy in providing other
telecom organizations with the opportunity to
enter a previously restricted marketplace. 2 8 0
As state-owned entities, both DT and FT's interests were tied to that of government,2 8 1 and as
Germany and France accounted for roughly 47%
of European telecom market share,28 2 DT and FT
perhaps stood to lose the most in a competitive
environment. The European Commission realized early on that securing assurances that liberalization timetables would be met by Germany and
France would be particularly difficult.2 83 In conditionally authorizing Atlas,2 84 the Commission

273 Id. at 54; see also Commission Decision, Phoenix, supra
note 268, at 75-76.
274 When Vice President Al Gore announced government intentions to lift foreign telecom-investment restrictions for certain competitors, the announcement was seen as
a specific attempt to exert pressure on Germany and France
to open their markets ahead of the 1998 EC deadline. See
Alan Cane and Emma Tucker, U.S. Offers Telecoms Incentive to
Europe, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1995, at 4.
275 See supra text and accompanying note 183.
276 Silvia Ascarelli, German Officials Fear U.S. Will Influence
Telecom Rules, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 13, 1996, at 3.
277 See supra text accompanying notes 196-198.
278 Culminating a lengthy comment period, release of
the FCC's final order listing six generalized criteria for determining the openness of a foreign market had been timed to
coincide with release of the FCC's Phoenix opinion;
although the final order had been drafted to address market
access concerns and foreign investment in U.S. telecom in
general, the Phoenix venture provided the FCC with a caseon-point to address market reciprocity concerns. See supra
text accompanying notes 225-227. The December 15, 1995,
Phoenix opinion represented the first practical application
of the six comparative market access criteria, colloquially
known as the 'Eco-test.'
279
See supra text accompanying notes 215-217.

280 In fact, the fourth largest U.S. long-distance carrier,
WorldCom, replaced DT as the telecom supplier for the
lower house of the German Parliament, and U.S.-based MFS
received a license to build a fiber-optic network in Paris.
Steven Lipin, Leslie Cauley and Douglas Lavin, Wake-up Call:
WorldCom, MPS Give EU Phone Companies a $14.4 Billion Surprise, WALL ST. J. EUR., Aug. 27, 1996, at 1.
281 Pursuant to the goals of the ONP Framework and
Competition in Services Directives, the opinion authorizing
Atlas stipulated that both the French and German governments would have to privatize DT and FT, respectively, and
separate member state regulatory functions from their operations. See Commission Decision, Atlas, supra note 267, at 38.
282 The figures are according to 1995 estimates among
the top eight member state markets. See Alan Cane, Competition Down the Line, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1995, at 15; see also
Appendix I, Figure 1.
283 Apart from DT's 210,000 employees representing a
large voting block of the Christian Democratic Party (Germany's party in power), the population commonly felt that
liberalization would allow foreigners to dominate the German market. See Kenneth Propp and Donald Koblitz, Will
Germany Hang Up on Telecom Reform?, WALL ST.J. EUR., Feb. 1,
1996, at 8.
284 See generally Commission Decision, Atlas, supra note 267,
at 23.

III.

ANALYSIS

92

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

[Vol. 5

was, like the United States, provided with immense leverage, but the goal was to push both
Germany and France down the path of telecom
reform.2 8 5 Despite occasional delays,28 6 both
countries have in fact begun fulfilling the legislative28 7 conditions of the EC opinion and embarked on a path toward privatization since liberalizing the market for alternative infrastructure
on July 1, 1996.288
As the EC recognized, the Atlas portion of the
alliance would give DT and FT the opportunity to
secure European market position in the face of
competition brought about by the liberalization
agenda.28 9 As expected, within a few short
months, several large European carriers were taking advantage of newly liberalized alternative infrastructure in Germany and France. 29 0 Similarly
for Sprint, the influx of capital that would come
with authorization of the Global One venture
would assist the carrier in positioning itself in a
vastly changing U.S. telecom marketplace.29 1 The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 allowed tradi-

tional long-distance carriers such as Sprint, the
opportunity to enter the local calling among
other new markets. 2 9 2 In addition to allowing
Sprint added advantage in securing market share
in new endeavors, 293 the additional capital would
make Sprint more competitive in its traditional
294
long-distance provider role.
The greatest stumbling block to overcome with
regard to having Atlas/Global One approved involved anti-trust issues. As the third, fourth and
eleventh largest carriers in the world, DT, FT and
Sprint, respectively, already controlled sizable
market share.2 9 5 Both the European Commission, the DOJ' and FCC recognized the obstacles
that needed to be overcome in approving the venture. To address these concerns, the opinions of
each body included four basic principles in attaching conditions to Atlas/Global One approval.
First, both the EC and U.S. opinions provided
that none of the partners individually, nor in their
capacity as Global One, could provide each other
with access to infrastructure or services at rates

285 FT and DT each acknowledged this leverage and in
the press releases announcing authorization of Global One,
and welcomed their role in furthering the EC's telecom
agenda. See, e.g., France Telecom, Global One Obtains FinalEuropean Approval, Sprint, Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom Welcome Decision of European Union, France Telecom press release
of July 17, 1996, France Telecom North America (visited Jan. 1,
1997) <http://www.francetelecom.com/ft/english releas/
eu7-17b.htm>.
286
When the Bundesrat stalled passage of interconnection regulations in mid-September, several U.S. carriers did
in fact complain to the FCC that German privatization was
not occurring fast enough. See Ascarelli, supra note 276, at 3.
287 The French Constitutional Council gave its approval
to opening alternative infrastructure to competition in early
July and an additional 30 more decrees are expected by the
end of the year concerning licenses, fees and the creation of
an agency to allocate frequencies. See Regulatory Watch, CONVERGENCE: A MAG. OF THE WALL ST.J. EUR., Autumn, 1996, at
24.
288 France will offer the first 20% of FT for sale in April
1997, with the full value of the company estimated at $29 to
$34.8 billion. Douglas Lavin, France Telecom to Sell 20% of Capital to the Public, Touting it as a Safe Bet, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
1996 at A19. Trading of the first 500 million shares in DT,
worth $979.9 million, would begin on November 18, 1996.
Deutsche Telekom Confirms Planfor IPO, Sets Dividend, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 7, 1996, at A18. On November 18, more than two
million private German investors bought shares in the
Telekom floatation, the second largest in the world, accounting for more than half of the previous total number of private shareholders in Germany. See Wolfgang Munchau and
Andrew Fisher, Telekom's Shares Surge in Busy First Day Trading,

DT would also bid jointly to acquire 60% of Spanish stateowned Retevision SA, which is poised to become Spain's second telephone operator by May 1997. World Wire: Spain's
Phone Sector Heats Up, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1996, at A17.
290
RWE (an energy conglomerate), Veba (a utility),
Viag (an industrial group) and Thyssen (a steel conglomerate) have all formed separate alliances with European partners to target DT's private network business in Germany. See
Michael Lindemann, Survey of International Telecommunications: Five Big Alliances Line Up for Battle, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3,
1995, at 11. In France, the utilities and property conglomerate Compagnie Generale des Eaux allied with BT to compete
with FT and enter other European markets. Cane and Owen,
supra note 129, at 21. Also, AT&T-Unisource entered the bidding for a stake in SNCF, France's second largest telecoms
network. See Owen and Cane, supra note 168, at 14.
291 Deregulation and accompanying competition have
squeezed profits at a time when Sprint was concentrating on
capital-intensive expansion, and until lately Sprint seemed
the most vulnerable of the "big three." Peter Elstrom, Did
You Say Sprint was No. 1 , Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 1996, at 72.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 262-263.
293 Sprint's most ambitious undertaking is its Sprint
Spectrum partnership (in which Sprint owns 40%) with cable
companies to provide PCS (personal communications system) service, a higher cost but better quality, higher capacity
wireless service than traditional cellular. See Elstrom, supra
note 291, at 73.
294 Despite that AT&T, MCI, Sprint and WorldCom presently account for 55%, 20%, 9% and 4.8% of the U.S. longdistance market, respectively, the BOCs expect to acquire 1525% of that market within three years; AT&T alone spent
$1.5 billion during the second quarter of 1996 in defense of
its long-distance customer base. Id. at 72-73; see also Appendix I, Figure 4.
295 See supra note 241; see also Appendix I, Figure 3.

FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1996, at 1.
289 See Commission Decision, Atlas, supra note 267, at 45-46.
Acting on the opportunity that the alliance provided, FT and
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that were discriminatory. 296 Transparent and
non-discriminatory access to infrastructure and
services are core principles of the ONP Framework Directive2 97 and will insure that the partners
will not inhibit competition through inflated cost
access to necessary infrastructure. Second, both
sets of opinions stipulated that authorization of
the venture was conditional on eventual review of
its competitive impact. The Commission's opinion made this review stipulation explicit in authorizing Atlas/Global One only for a period of
five and seven years, respectively.2 98 Both the
DOJ2"9 and FCC3 00 implied a review provision in
that both would monitor Sprint reports to determine whether the German and French markets
had truly liberalized. Third, both sets of opinions
placed ownership restrictions-on Sprint, DT and
FT individually. Both DT and FT are precluded
from including their public switched data networks in the venture until the liberalization deadline had been met.30 1 Similarly, Sprint is precluded from owning or controlling DT or FT
assets during the first phase of the DOJ authorization or from increasing its international long-distance capacity to Germany and France beyond
that which it already has. 3 0 2 Finally, both opinions apply strict reporting requirements to each
of the partners and Global One,3 03 the most vital
tool in insuring that possible anti-competitive effects are addressed promptly.3 04 The inclusion of

these four conditions, among others in the EC
and U.S. opinions, serves to check possible anticompetitive activity by Global One in the near
term.30 5 Importantly for the United States, authorization of the venture also affirms the DOJ's
policy of insuring that possible anti-competitive
affects of a venture are mitigated by appropriate
conditions, while assuring that possible benefits of
3 06
the joint-venture remain intact.
With changing conditions in the global telecom
marketplace and an anti-trust waiver for Global
One, many have expressed fear that the present
wave of alliances will likely result in a handful of
global "supercarriers."3 0 7 In this regard, the EC
Competition in Services Directive did not address
potential private monopolies3 0 that might result
from liberalization of the predominantly stateowned market. However, at least at this stage of
telecom market development, having several
large, global carriers is likely necessary to achieving longer-term benefits. The Global One alliance provides its partners, DT, FT, and Sprint, access to global markets and infrastructure under
"one roof," a crucial element to properly provide
seamless basic and value-added services to large
multinational customers.30 9 As global consortia
like Global One, Concert and AT&T-Unisource
are best positioned to provide "one-stop-shopping" for the international needs of multinational
companies,3 10 they are filling a vital need in the

See supra text accompanying notes 204, 239, and 242.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
298
See supra text and accompanying note 269.
299
See supra text accompanying notes 208-209.
300
See supra text accompanying note 234.
301
By keeping the data networks out of the alliance until
liberalization, DT and FT will not be collectively controlling
79% of the German and 77% of the French market for all
data communication services while still maintaining special
and exclusive rights. See Commission Decision, Atlas, supra
note 267, at 27. The decision to keep the data networks out
of the alliance will not likely impact competitive access but
does provide the Commission with an additional 'carrot and
stick' to insure DT and FT's compliance with the liberalization timetable.
302
See supra text accompanying note 203. Until 1998,
Sprint will not be able to improve on overseas connections
which already distinguish it as the dominant carrier for U.S.German and U.S.-French telecom traffic. See supra text accompanying notes 231-232.
303
See e.g., supra text accompanying note 234.
304
See Tarjanne, supra note 103, at 9 (explaining that information flow is vital for the efficient operation of markets,
for policy evaluation and for further regulation). This will be
particularly important in monitoring Germany's regulatory
environment, which many believe will continue to protect

DT "with rules governing how much competitors must pay to
tap into DT's network." Silvia Ascarelli, Deutsche Telekom Enters New World, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1996, at A9.
305
See Commission Decision, Phoenix, supra note 268, at 72
(explaining that as the EC regards global markets as still
emerging, entry of a carrier like Global One is additionally
appropriate in that Concert is presently the dominant player
in that market).
306
See supra text and accompanying note 103. DOJ conditions were applied to eliminate possible anti-competitive
"output-restricting practice [s]" of the venture, while employing an "[economic] rule of reason analysis" to realize "prospect[s] for substantial benefits." Landes, supra note 103, at
82.
307
See Cane and Owen, supra note 129, at 21. As a result,
smaller carriers will have to decide whether to ally themselves
with a supercarrier or seek a profitable market niche. See
Cane, supra note 131, at 17.
308
See Harkness, supra note 67, at 193.
309
In this regard, "[t]he customer is leaving regulators
with little choice" but to approve such alliances as global
companies are tired of dealing with a myriad of suppliers.
The Global Free-for-All: As Huge New Telecom Markets Open, Carmers Aim to Carve Up the World, Bus. WK., Sept. 26, 1994, at 119.
310
See supra text accompanying notes 139-141.
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marketplace.3 1 1 Additionally, by adding international perspective to their joint-venture scenario,
the alliance partners were adding a global dimension to their operations that both the United
States3 1 2 and EC,3 13 respectively, considered vital
to each partner's ability to remain competitive in
the changing marketplace.
The interrelation of global telecom companies
has already resulted in increased and faster development of new technologies, particularly in regard to the Internet.3 14 Resulting telecom services will also reach customers at a faster rate than
would have been possible if each carrier in the alliance had acted alone.31 5 These innovations in
the marketplace serve to enhance both the EC
and U.S. ability to achieve "Information Society"
goals.3 16 To facilitate development of the information super highway, it is necessary to not simply
connect networks, a basic skill, but to fully integrate network systems, making seamless service
and network management possible.3 1 7 This precept recognizes that the "information super highway" already exists in disparate pieces."" Companies with sufficient capital and technology to
.integrate networks and increase their speed and
efficiency will facilitate this development,3 1" and
the global alliances are in the best position to ful-

fill this need.3 2 0
The prospect that global competition will lead
to rationalization of telecom resources, leaving a
handful of carriers with the capital and geographic reach to service the multinational market,
is similar in many respects to the development of
the railroads during the industrial revolution. 3 2 1
Globalization of the world workforce is both driving and being driven by developments in telecom
technology, 3 2 2 as development of the railroads
both drove and was driven by U.S. westward expansion. Like the prospects for the global
telecom alliances, it took the investment and size
of the railroad conglomerates (i.e., Union Pacific,
New York Central, B&O etc.) of the 1800s to push
lines across the country, facilitating both interconnection and capacity in the rail industry. 323
In passing the Sherman and Clayton acts of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, respectively, the government was acting retroactively
to break up a nearly 100 year development of industrial trust facilitated by vast railroad networks.
Had the government acted earlier to break up the
rail monopolies, perhaps we would not have the
rail networks that exist today. In the case of modem telecom, the prospect of divestiture and close
scrutiny has already existed for more than a dec-

311
Despite being prohibited from advertising in Europe
until the fall of 1996, See Lindemann, supra note 166, at 2,
Global One has acquired more than 30,000 global business
customers since February 1996, Martin Rosenberg, Global One
President Chosen; New EuropeanExecutive Will Operatefrom Headquartersin Brussels, Belgium, KAN. CrrY STAR, Sept. 10, 1996, at
D3.
312 See Proposed Final Judgment, supra note 197, at
44,061 (explaining that the global consortia concept is necessary to meet the needs of multinational customers).
313
Commission Decision, Phoenix, supra note 268, at 71 (explaining that "only a truly global dimension would make the
cooperation between DT and FT in the framework of Atlas
sufficiently important to consider an exemption from the
prohibition of Article 85(1)").
314
Global One will begin offering intranet (internal corporate network) services early in 1997, providing messaging,
groupware and Web hosting. Sprint and its Partners in Europe
Plan Foray into IntranetMarket, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1996. Concert has recently installed twelve large ATM switches and fiber optic links which will increase global Internet capacity by
about one-third. See Cane, supra note 144, at 2.
315
See Commission Decision, Phoenix, supra note 268, at 71
(explaining that Global One alliance will allow consumers to
reap technological benefits sooner than would have been
possible had each carrier acted alone).
3.16
Vice President Gore had stated early in the Clinton
Administration that the information superhighway should be
built by an "aggressive, forward-thinking" public sector, and
most recently, the Administration has publicly stepped aside

to let private firms do the work. E.K. Schlesinger, Finance:
Top 10 Fat Cats, GEORGE, Nov., 1996, at 104.
117 See Cane, supra note 144, at 2 (explaining that such
seamless service and management is necessary to properly
utilize a telecom conduit to furnish convergence applications).
318
Venture Capitalists Don Valentine and Michael Moritz
have Plenty of Opinions about Who will Win and Lose in the
Telecom War, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1996, at R23.
319 DT presently owns the world's largest ISDN network,
comprising one of every three ISDN connections in the
world. Michael Lindemann, Doubts Over Earnings Potential,
FIN. TIMEs, Sept. 19, 1996, at 4.
320 At the core of Global One's business will be the implementation of a "common global network and information
systems platform rationalizing and integrating the international data, voice, and overlay networks of the partners." See
Commission Decision, Phoenix, supra note 268, at 63.
321 Vast expansion in the rail industry and competition
between large conglomerates had in fact led to consolidation
and rationalization of resources in the late 1800s. See Stuart
Daggett, Ph.D., RAILROAD REORGANIZATION 338-40 (1908).
322 Martin Orth, Management Consultant Roland Berger on
Income, the Jobs of Tomorrow, and Human Creativity, DEUTSCHLAND, Aug., 1996, at 8.
323
Between 1865 and 1890, the number of miles of track
in the United States grew from 35,000 to 166,000, much of it
running through sparsely populated lands. See Arnst and
Mandel, supra note 21, at 66.
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ade, both in the United States and in the EC. Additionally, globalization of competitive principles
.has begun to insure that there will no longer be
"islands of high earners without concomitant high
performance."3 2 4 Global alliances and national
government entities that monitor competition
must work in close cooperation, and the existence
of the U.S./European Community Agreement on
Anti-trust Cooperation is an example of the type
of teamwork that must be fostered.3 2 5 In tolerating the potential monopolistic activity of Global
One, the EC is affirming the necessity for activity
that is of vast economic benefit flowing directly to
the consumer.3 26 With the proper. government
organizations and pro-competitive regulations in
place, as are presently evident in both the EC and
United States, we should take. the opportunity to
enjoy a period of enormous growth in the
telecom marketplace and the developments that a
global venture like Global One will bring. As long
as the EC, the DOJ and FCC remain vigilant defenders of competition, vigilance that they have
shown conditionally approving Global One, 3 2 7 the
benefits of innovation will outweigh reactionary
fears of a "telecom trust."
IV.

CONCLUSION

EC and U.S. telecom initiatives of the past decade have been geared toward development of increased competition in the marketplace and concomitant preservation of the public interest in
universal service. In addition, with the EC approaching full liberalization of its telecom markets in 1998 and the U.S. market invigorated by
competition among long-distance, local and alternative telecom carriers, consumers in both the EC
and United States will benefit from lower rates
and.the availability of new and technologically advanced services. However, the same competitive
engine that will drive consumer developments
also has begun to force incumbent telecommunications companies in the EC and United States to
See Orth, supra note 322, at 8.
See Ungerer, supra note 51, at 1175.
326 See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
327 In the wake of the BT-MCI merger announcement,
Global One began talks with Britain's Cable & Wireless
("C&W'), citing that C&W's inclusion in the alliance would
be "logical," expanding Global One's reach into Asia where
C&W owns 57% of Hong Kong Telecom. Douglas Lavin,
324

325
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seek alliances to preserve revenues and enter new
markets.
Within these competitive developments, DT of
Germany and FT of France have forged the
Global One joint-venture with Sprint of the
United States, prompting concern over the prospect of a new private telecom monopoly. In addressing the possible anti-competitive activity that
could emanate from the venture, the EC and
United States were primarily concerned the
closed nature of the German and French telecom
markets. Approval of the alliance gave each government tremendous leverage to insure these
markets would eventually open to competition.
In granting conditional authorization of Global
One, the EC and United States are insuring that it
will not deter competition before the German
and French markets are liberalized. In addition,
both governments recognize that the alliance fills
a vital role in the marketplace, apart from the
market-opening leverage it created. The emerging market that Global One and similar alliances
seek to enter, the provision of telecom services for
multinational companies, can only be properly
served by a company with enormous geographic
reach and capital resources. Multinational corporations prefer "one-stop shopping" in servicing
their telecom needs, and no single telecom company alone has the resources and skills to fill that
market need.
Additionally, in combining the resources of DT,
FT and Sprint, Global One will be accomplishing
a global integration of networks, a task that is vital
to further development of the information superhighway. Both the EC and United States have
supported development of the information superhighway as a near-term telecom policy goal, and
each has acknowledged that the private sector is
in the best position to further this goal.
The present wave of consolidation among
huge, global telecom carriers, a movement that
Global One is indicative of, is commensurate with
vast railroad development and subsequent rationCable & Wireless, Global One May Ally, Creatinga Rival to BTMCI Venture, WALL Sr. J., Nov. 11, 1996, at B6. This type of
expansion would likely not arouse as much resistance from
EC and U.S. regulators who would be more concerned with
additional FT and DT investment in Sprint prior to the January, 1998 liberalization deadline. See Keller, supra note 169,
at B9.

96

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

alization of resources during the industrial revolution. Anti-trust concerns regarding the railroad
industry and industrial development remained
unaddressed until passage of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts in 1890 and 1914, respectively. By
contrast to that period however, the present-day
telecom market has undergone anti-trust scrutiny
for over a decade. In addition, globalization of
the marketplace and resulting competition, will
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insure that high earnings among telecom market
actors will not occur without concomitant high
performance. With legislation and government
structures that are presently in place and antitrust cooperation between the EC and United
States, authorization of Global One and similar
ventures will translate into consumer benefits in a
streamlined global telecom environment.
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Figure 2

APPENDIX I
Figure 1
Percent of EC Telecom Revenue Share Held
Among Top Eight Member State Markets (1995)

Percent of French Telecom Revenue
Share Controlled by FT (1995)
(out of US$30.96 billion)
Other French
Carriers

(out of US$ 176.2 billion)

4%

FT

96%
Germany
29%

Italy
14%

Alan Cane, Competition Down the Line, FIN. TIMEs, Jan.
19, 1995, at 15 (providing projected revenue totals for
the top eight European telecom markets in ECU).
Currency Trading: New York ForeignExchange Selling Rates
for October 23, 1996, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1996, at C22
(providing a standard exchange rate of US$1.2587 to
the ECU for conversion of figures in the preceding article).

Percent of French Telecom Revenue
Share Controlled by DT (1995)
(out of US$53.36billion)
Other German
Carriers
25%

DT
75%

France Telecom Reports 1995 Results, France Telecom
Press Release of May 15, 1996, <http://www.
francetelecom.com/ft/englishreleas/resul95j.
htm>(providing 1995 revenues for FT in US$). Management Report, Deutsche Telekom Press Release of September 10, 1996, <http://www.Dtag.DE/gb95/
lagerbericht_.html> (providing 1995 revenues for DT
in DM). Cane, supra note for Figure 1, at 15 (providing projected revenue totals for the telecom markets of
Germany and France in ECU). Currency Trading,supra
note for Figure 1, at C22 (providing a standard exchange rate of US$1.2587 to the ECU and US$.6573 to
the DM for conversion of figures in the preceding article and press release).
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Figure 3
Percent of World Telecom Revenues
Held by Major U.S. and EC Carriers (1995)
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tee on Commerce, Trade & Hazardous Materials,
104th Cong., 2nd Sess., 104-89, at 13 (May 9, 1996)
(testimony of Ambassador Jeffrey M. Lang) (providing
figure for 1995 world telecom revenues).

(out of US$500 billion)
Figure 4
GTE

FT
6%

DT
8%

Percent of U.S. Telecom Revenues
Held by Major U.S. Carriers (1995)

4%

(out of US$215 billion)
NY NEX
7 BOCs
18%

WorldCom
1%

WorldCom
2%

AT&T

Sprint
6%

9%

AirTouch
1%

MCI

BT

3

4%

France Telecom Reports 1995 Results, supranote for Figure
2 (providing 1995 revenues for FT in US$). Management Report, supra note for Figure 2 (providing 1995
revenues for DT in DM). First QuarterResults to june 30,
1996, British Telecom Press Release of July 25, 1996,
<http://www.bt.com/newsroom/document/nr9657f.
htm> (providing 1995 revenues for DT in i). Currency
Trading, supra note for Figure 1, at C22 (providing a
standard exchange rate of US$.6573 to the DM and
US$1.5975 to the f for conversion of figures in the preceding press releases). Titans of Telecom, Bus. WK., Apr.
8, 1996, at 74 (providing all additional individual carrier revenues for 1995 in US$). A Hearing on International Telecommunications of the House Subcommit-

3%

BellSouth
8%

GTE

WorldCom, Inc. Reports Record 1995 Results, WorldCom
Press Release of March 6, 1996, <http://www.
wcom.]ol]com/press/030696.html> (providing 1995
revenues for WorldCom in US$). Titans of Telecom,
supra note for Figure 3, at 74 (providing all other individual U.S. carrier revenues for 1995 in US$). Testimony of Ambassador Jeffrey M. Lang, supra note for
Figure 3, at 13 (providing figure 1995 U.S. telecom revenues).

